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L INfRODUCTION
As discussed in my previous work in An Insight into Insider
Trading in G~Tater ChiruL,' Ollna should be considered a late
starter in terms of its insider trading regulatory framework in the
Greater China region (compared with Hong Kong and Taiwan). As
the Chinese equity market becomes one of the major stock markets
in the Asia Pacific region, Ollnese legal authorities have started to
become aware of the importance of an insider trading regulatory
framework in order to facilitate its equity market into a healthy investment environment for investors around the world.
ln recognizing its importance, Chinese legal authority not only
introduced Security Law in 2005, which provided a mechanism that
made it possible for people to bring civil action for losses due to
insider trading, but the Supreme Court of China also prescribed
"Standing for Legal Action.~ Within the provisions, it stipulated the
dispute of insider trading of securities and manipulation of the securities trading.2 Thus, the formal legal foundation of actions taken
for insider trading was finally established.
In 2007, China's Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
prescribed "the ways to recognize insider trading" on a trial basis.
In addition, the Supreme Court also initiated the interpretation and
drafting for cases with insider trading and market manipulation.3
According to the new "Securities Law", securities fraud includes three categories: false statements, insider trading, and market manipulation.• Civil actions can be brought against all three of
these forms. However, in practice, the court only accepts false statements when every action on securities fraud arises. Insider trading.
market manipulation, and other causes of civil compensation cases
are "temporarily not being accepted".
Jn reality, the regulatory framework for insider trading should
be a growing mechanism and be amended with the growth of the
equity market. As China's equity market grows into an important
equity market in the financial world, China's original regulatory
framework for insider trading has become inadequate. As a result,
the focus of this paper aims to examine the recent insider trading
I. Greg Tzu Jan Yang" An lnsig)lt into ln>ider Tradon& on G"'ater Otina", Mary·
land Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. I - 2010 (200). Baltimore: University
of Maryland Scllool of Law.
2. OH Bi Lan, "The F'trSt Serious Case of Insider Tradina", Lepl Rules aod Dem·
ocratic Times, Oclober 13, 2008. p. 2.
3. lbitL
4. Ibid.
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cases in China and tries to provide new perspectives on the Chinese
regulatory framework. on insider trading in comparison with recent
insider trading developments in the United States.
11.

RECENT REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT

The growing importance of China's equity market can be seen
by its growing number of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) listing in
2010. Even though China's stock market has underperformed compared to the global equity market in 2010, China replaced the U.S.
and Brazil to become the most active new IPO listing market. For
the first half of 2010, there were a total of 175 I POs in the Shanghai
and Shenzhen stock market, averaging 1.5 lPO per day, receiving
RMB$323.8 billion from the market (USD$1 = RMB$6.3577 as of
August, 2012).' The growing number of IPOs is due to the Chinese
government actively encouraging small to medium sized companies
to be listed in the Shenzhen Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) or
Shanghai Stock Exchange Small & Medium Enterprises Composites (SSE SME). This in tum has made China's A-shares to be
listed the most IPOs in the world.6
On the other side of the coin, this growing number of IPO list·
ings has created a new class of wealthy people who gained wealth
by listing their company in exchange for capital from the equiry
market. On average, during the first half of 2010, China created 600
bil lionaires from IPO listings (which means 1.5 billionaires were
created every day).' As a result, the growing number of wealthy
people with easy access to market capital created a breeding environment for insider trading activities. This is because the expected
IPO stock rally often provided a mechanism for company owners
and major shareholders to drastically increase their wealth overnight, therefore increasing the temptation for people to engage in
insider trading as it is human nature for rich people to want to be·
come richer.
In recognizing the inadequacy in its insider trading regulatory
framework, China's Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in
July 29, 2010 decided to launch the Interim Provisions on the Securities Investment Advisor Business and Tentative Provisions for lssuS. Bloomberg PrOie$SiOnal System, Bloomberg Finance LP. USA.
6. CHENG Hui Yuen •· Active IPO Listing: China is in the Middle ol Wealth Crea·
lion l'rocess" (2010) Wanl Daily, Taipei, Taiwan. 8 Augu51, AS.
7. CllENG Hui Yuen "ACiive JPO LiSiing: Chinn is In Ihe MiddleofWeallh Crea·
lion Proce•s" (2010) Wanl Daily, Taipei, Taiwan, 8 Augusl. AS.
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ance of Securities-related Research Reports, to further regulate the
investment environment in China.8
Within the Interim Provisions on the Securities Investment Advisor Business, securities consulting companies should not provide,
buy, or seU advice for particular securities on TV, Internet, radio, or
any other publications. This is to prevent securities consulting analysts or companies from profiting by advice given to the investor
regarding buying or seUing particular stocks. Also, within this Interim Provisions on the Securities Investment Advisor Business, securities companies who engage in business related to securities or
investment consultation is forbidden from engaging in the related
business of proprietary trading or asset management.9 This prevents
securities consulting companies from engaging in opposite trades
with their client hence profiting at the loss of their client.
The Interim Provisions on the Release of Securities Research
Reports is focused on regulating the research reports published by
securities companies. When issuing a research report on a particular
company, the regulation requires securities companies to announce
the amount of the particular shares the company held on hand.
Also, on the research report published date and the next trading
date, the company proprietary department can not engage in trades
in opposite with the recommendation from the research report. 10
The new regulations focus on regulating the publication of research
reports from disclosing insider information or atlowing their clients
to counter trades in the market and profiting from the general investments publics. This regulation is to focus on the independence
of the information in research report.
Also, under the growth and development of China's stock,
there are a growing number of criminal cases on insider trading
over recent years. Up to 2011, there were a total of twenty-two
cases on insider trading being closed. There was one case in 2IXJ7,
one case in 2008, four cases in 2009, five cases in 2010, and eleven
cases in 2011. This indicates that insider trading cases have grown at
an exponential rate in China over the past few years. As a result,
this had led the Supreme People's Court to declare in May 22, 2012
that they decided to introduce a new regulation regarding insider
trading the Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Specific
8. CHEN Shu Lan "China Introduce New Regulations ro Prevent Stock Price Ma·
nipulation from Stock Analysts" (2010) Want Daily. Taipei. Taiwan. 8 August. A5.

9. Ibid. .
10. CHEN Shu Lan "China Introduce New Regulations to Pre\·ent Stock Price Ma·
nipulatio.n from Stock Analysts" (2010) Want Daily. Taipei, Taiwan. 8 August, A5.
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Application of Law in Handling the Criminal Cases of Insider Trod·
ing and Divulgement of Insider Information {hereinafter referred to
as "the Interpretation of Insider Trading") on June 1, 2012. There
are eleven sections in the Interpretation of Insider Trading and this
wiU provide a systematic regulatory framework focus on regulating
people with inside information, people receiving inside information
illegally, and sensitive time span for inside information, insider
trading and the punishment for leaking inside information."
The introduction of this new regulation should be regarded as
a big step for the Chinese regulation framework in recognizing the
importance and significance of insider trading. Besides introducing
new regulations, the development of a few insider trading cases has
also made the Chinese regulatory framework more comprehensive
and complete in recent years. In the foUowing sections, we wiU discuss the development of a few important insider trading cases in
China in recent years. Besides the case on HUANG Guangyu, there
are a few new important cases that have developed in recent years,
the Qingdao Kingking and Guoyuan Securities. Also, we will closely
examine the dealing of sheU listing in Chinese companies, as it has
become a popular mechanism for quick IPO listing in China, which
led to many insider trading activities as a consequence. On the
other hand, we will also use the case on Raj Rajaratnam in the
United States to compare and contrast with Chinese insider cases to
illustrate how insider trading cases are being dealt with in a developed financial market.

m.

CASES OF INSIDER TRADING IN CHINA
A. HUANG Guangyu: Refreshing on the Case Details

As the detail of the HUANG Guangyu case was discussed in
my precious work, An Insight into Insider Trading in Greater China,
we will only briefly go over a few important points on this case:
- HUANG Guangyu, chairman of Gome Electrical Appliances
Holdings Ltd, (Gome) China's biggest electrical appliance
retailer, was arrested by Beijing Police in late November

2008.
- From 2006, after two years of investigation, the police uncovered evidence of RMB$70 billion in suspicious capital
transactions under Huang's name, and linked him with fi.
nancial misdeeds including share price manipulation and
money laundering.
11. People's Daily, http://www.people.oom.cn. May 22, 2012, China.
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- On the same day, officials from the CSRC confirmed that
Beijing Eagle Investment Co Ltd- a company controlled by
Huang - was suspected of manipulating share prices of San/ian Commercial Co Ltd (Sanlian), and Beijing Centergate
Technologies Co Ltd (Beijing Centergate).12
- Huang was investigated for seven financial crimes such as
bribing senior officials before Gome's listing in Hong Kong,
evading taxes by injecting assets into an overseas shell company during Gome's merger with Shanghai-based electronics
retailer Yongle; money laundering concerning Shandong
Jintai; manipulating the share prices of Beijing Centergate
Technologies and San/ian Commercial; and transferring
company assets through an underground banking system to
his own accounts. 13
- On August 2008, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched a
stormy investigation into high-level corruption in the foreign
investment administration. Several Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM) officials were forced to step down and
HUANG Guangyu's name came up during the investigation.
People close to the investigation said that some officials confessed to accepting bribes from Huang before Gome's listing
in Hong Kong and during its merger with Yongle. 14
- What's more, MOFCOM's approval of the merger was surprisingly swifr. As it was registered on the British Virgin Islands (BVI), Gome was actually a foreign invested company.
Therefore, it was very unusual for MOFCOM to llave spent
only eight days on the reviewing process for a merger involved a foreign invested company. As it was later being discovered, two of the MOFCOM officials under investigation
- GUO Jingyi, inspector of the Department of Treaty and
Law, and DENG Zhan, former deputy director of the Department of Foreign Investment Administration - played a
key role in the approval of the merger. 1s

12. YAN Pei, "Dead End for a Tycoon's Creati\•e Financing", http://www.cbina.org.
en, December 3, 2008.
13. Caijiog Magazine, bup:l/www.englisb.caijing.com.cn, December 11, 2008.
14. YAN Pei, "Dead End for a Tycoon's Creati,•e Fmancing", http://www.cbina.org.
en, December 3, 20)8.
15. Ibid.
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B. The SheD of Huang
Besides the above details of Huang's case, HUANG Guangyu
was one of the early success stories in first shell listing by successfully bringing his company Game Electrical Appliances Holding Ltd
to list in Hong Kong Stock Exchange through shell borrowing listing in 2004. This success in shell listing on IPO made him become
the number one richest man in China. Due to this early success,
Huang decided to replicate his early success and engaged in shell
borrowing listing a few years later. It was the second shell that bad
brought Huang under investigation and finally his conviction. Even
though the details of shell borrowing and making listing will be discussed in a later section, the details on bow Huang made his shell
will be discussed in detail in this section. This is because the importance of Huang's shell listing process is an important indication that
led to his insider trading activities and the consequence that led to
small shareholder/investor's suffering from this case.
1.

The First Shell:

Huang started his shell listing process by selecting a Hong
Kong listed company named Jinghua Automation Group. Through
issuing equity and acquiring new shares, this company acquired
Huang and his brother's company through reverse acquisition. In
return, they bad gained control of this company, Jinghua Automation Group. In July 2002, they changed the name of the company
into Chi110 Eagle. Huang also established another company named
Beijing Eagle and be bad 100% control of this company. He then
established Gome Electrical, which is 65% controlled by Beijing Eagle and be directly owned the remaining 35% interest in Game.
Then, he established another company named Ocean Town in British Virgin Island and he registered Gome Holding in BVI and bad
100% control of Ocean Town. From April 2004, Beijing Eagle
transfered its 65% Game shares to Ocean Town and the Hong
Kong listed China Eagle acquired Ocean Town hence Chi110 Eagle
had 65% shares of Game Electrical. Finally, Huang changed China
Eagle's name into Gome Electrical Applicances and achieved his
goal in listing in Hong Kong through shell listing.' 6
Game Electrical Appliances bad achieved its goal of public listing through shell listing all the way from Jinghua Automation
16. CHOW Chin Yen ""The Protection for Small/Medium lnveston; under Shell

Usting Process'' China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House. http://www.
cnki.net, March, 2011.
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Group to China Eagle and finally Gome Electrical Applianus. For
HUANG Guangyu, he had gained a huge profit in cash by selling
his shares of Game on the stock market. On the other band, it is the
smal l and individual investors who bad suffered during this process.
This is because in September 2000, Huang or the controlling shareholders of Jinghuo Automation Group wanted to affirm its control
of the company and diluted the control of other existing shareholders and in return issued 31 million new shares at HKD$0.4 to raise
HKD$11.9 million (USD$1 = HKD$7.7577 as of August, 2012)17
through private placement. On tbe other hand, the total number of
shares issued has increased to 188 million shares and share prices
plummeted from HKD$1.2 in June to HKD$0.6 in September. As
the new issue of 31 million of new shares only accounted for 19.7%
of total shares issued (which is below the 20% threshold), new
shares issued do not need to cease trading in the stock market nor
receive approval through shareholder meetings. In September 2001,
Ji.nglwo Amomation Group decided to issue new shares again and
issued 44.3 million shares at HKD$0.18 and acquired HKD$7.97
million. Again, the new shares issued were 19.8% and no shareholder approval was required. This time, the share price plummeted
to below HKD$0.2. 18 As a result, this is the best illustration of the
interest of small sbareholdersfmvestor being disregarded and
manipulated by the company controller and major shareholders.
On the other band, the easy money and quick cash of shell listing
had increased Huang's appetite for money and became a prelude
for his later downfall.

2. The Second Shell:
As Game had made him tbe richest man in China. Huang decided to push his real estate company into the public capital market
as well. As a result, he decided to replicate his shell listing success
for bis real estate property company. In order to find his shell, be
engaged in a relationship with three different companies. One was
his brother's company ST Jimai. The other two were the companies
he controlled: San/ian Commercial Co Ltd, and Beijing Centergate
Teclmologies Co Ltd . 19
17. Bloomberg Professional
18. /l>ul.
19. KAO Shiu Guo

Sr>~cm,

Bloomberg Futanee LP, USA .

·s-Oft SbeU and Fail on SbeU·, Cbma Acaden:uc: Journal

Electtonlt Publ.islliQg House, WWW.alkLO<t. 2009.
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In order to let his real estate business be publicly listed, the
first shell he approached was Beijing Centergate Technologies Co
Ltd. Beijing Centergate was publicly listed in 1999 at Shenzhen
Stock Exchange with capital stock of around 675 million shares.
Even though Beijing Centergate mostly engaged in research, development, and investment on high tech products, its business performance was definitely less than satisfactory. As a result, this had
brought Beijing Centergate into the vulture eyes of Huang. From
2006, Huang let his investment company, Beijing Pengtai Investment, Co Ltd begin to acquire the shares of Beijing Centergate and
when he acquired up to 29.58% shares, he became a major shareholder in Beijing Centergate. Through the reverse acquisition he
had previously done, by May 4, 2008, Beijing Centergate announced
its acquisition of Huang's Beijing Pengrun Property Development
Holding Company Limited and hence transformed from a technologies company into a real estate company. Unfortunately, this acquisition was not successful. Three months later, Beijing Centergate
announced to abort the plan on acquiring Beijing Pengrun Property
Development Holding Company Limited. Even though Huang continued to look for another shell, he had already engaged in insider
trading by manipulating the share price of Beijing Centergate during
the shell making process. He first spread bad news about Beijing
Centergate in the stock market on June 27, 2007 in order for him
and his affiliated parties to acquire shares of Beijing Centergate at
low prices. On May 7, 2008, he let Beijing Centergate announce the
news of company restructuring in order to stimulate a rally in share
prices. As a result, he sold around RMB$300 million of Beijing
Centergate shares on May 7 and 8.20 This insider trading activity
attracted the attention of Chinese regulators and later led to the
downfall of Huang.
As the shell making on Beijing Centergate was unsuccessful,
Huang approached another potential shell, San/ian Commercial Co
Ltd. In February 14, 2008 Huang approached San/ian by acquiring
27 million shares of San/ian through his controlled real estate company, Shandong Long Ji Dao Co Ltd and gained controlled on Sanlion with 19.71% shares. During this process, the news that San/ian
would become a shell for Huang bad spread in the market. This had
made the share price and traded volume of San/ian to change turbulently. For example, the traded volume of San/ian on March 10
was only 34,000 shares. From March 11, the traded volume in20. Ibid.
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creased to 28 million shares and on March 12, to 47 million shares.
This huge increase in traded volume attracted CSRC's attention
and they began to investigate San/ian on March 28. This later led to
the arrest of H uang and the downfall of his money empire?'
IV. THE JUDGMENT OF HUANG'S CASE
A. The First Instance Judgment
After years of investigation and prosecution, on May 18, 2010,
in the first instance judgment in the HUANG Guangyu's case, Beijing Second Intermediate People's Court issued its judgment: for the
crime of illegal business dealings, the court sentenced HUANG
Guangyu to a jail term of 8 years and ordered his personal properties valued at RMB$200 million to be confiscated; for the crime of
insider trading, the court sentenced HUANG Guangyu to a jail
term of 9 years, and ordered fines of RMB$600 million; for the
crime of corporate bribery, the court sentenced HUANG Guanyu
to a jail term of 2 years. Upon a joinder of punishment for the
several counts of the crime, the Court decided to enforce a jail term
of 14 years, with fines of RMB$600 million and confiscation of personal property valued at RMB$200 million.22
As shown from the court judgment, the court focused on three
major crimes Huang had committed:

1. Crime of Illegal Business Dealings
D uring the period from September 2007 to November 2007,
Huang had violated relevant state regulations by engaging in illegal
foreign exchange trading with RMB settlement in the mainland and
H ong Kong Dollar settlements outside the mainland. The violation
involves the transfer of RMB$800 million, either directly or through

Beijing Heng Yi Xiang Business Consulting Company Limited
(H eng Yi Xiang), to Shenzhen Sheng Feng Yuan Industry Company
Limited (Sheng Feng Yuan) and other entities, and unauthorized
exchange and purchase of foreign currency through ZHENG
Xiaowei (prosecuted under a separate action) and the receipt of
over HK$822 million (or over US$105 million) in Hong Kong.23
21. KAO Shiu Guo "Success on SheD and Fail on Shell", China Academic Journal
EleCironic Publishing House, www.cnki.net. 2009.
22. The judgment of lbe first instance of HUANG Guangyu case (Full Version) •
May 18, 2010. btlp:/lfinance.sina.com.cnlstoclc/s/20100519122117970228.sbtml
23. Ibid.
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2.

Crime of Insider Trading and Divulging of Inside
Information

During the period from April 2007 to June 28, 2007, Huang
abused his official position as the controlling shareholder and director of Beijing Centergate Technology Company Limited by deciding
and ordering others to buy in over 9.76 million Beijing Centergate
shares in cumulative trading, for a total price of more than
RMB$93.1 million during the period from April 27, 2007 through
June 27, 2007 in connection with the contemplated asset swap between Beijing Centergate and Beijing Eagle, a company operated
and managed by Huang. The buy transaction was made through
securities accounts opened in the name of Mr. Long, Mr. Wang and
another 4 persons, with actual control of Huang, and when the relevant public announcement was made on June 28, 2007, the book
earnings of the 6 securities accounts stood at more than RMB$3.48
million.24
During the period from July or August, 2007 to May 7, 2008,
Huang decided and ordered others to buy over 104 million Beijing
Centergate shares in cumulative trading for a total price of more
than RMB$1.322 billion during the period from August 13·, 2007
through September 28, 2007 in connection with the contemplated
100% equity acquisition by Beijing Centergate of Beijing Pengrun
Property Development Holding Company Limited and related restructuring. The buy transaction was made through securities accounts opened in the name of CAO Chujuan, LIN Jiafeng and
another 77 individuals, the trading through those securities accounts was however under the actual control of Huang, and when
the relevant public announcement was made on May 7, 2008, the
book earnings of the 79 securities accounts stood at more than
RMB$306 million.25
3.

Crime of Corporate Bribery

As a principal officer of the Defendant Entities Pengrun Property and Gome, Huang directed XU Zhongmin to request illegal
favors from XIANG Huaizhu during the period from 2006 through
to 2008 in connection with the handling of relevant cases involving
Pengrun Property and Gome, and Huang offered, or directed XU
Zhongmin to offer, XIANG Huaizhu payment and other valuables
24. Ibid.

25. Ibid. .
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in a total amount of over RMB$1.06 million on two separate
occasions.26
B. The Second Instance Judgment
The second instance judgment was announced at the court
house of Beijing Higher People's Court the morning of August 30,
2010. The court upheld the first instance court ruling of joinder
punishment for the three counts of offences of Huang, including a
jail term of 14 years, with fines and confiscation of properties totaling RMB$800 million. The first instance ruling against Huang's
wife, DU Juan, was revised to probation for a jail term of 3 years
with stayed execution, and was released at the courthouse.27

C. The Final Judgment from the Supreme People's Court
The China Supreme People's Court on May 22, 2012 declared
their sentence on HUANG Guangyu and his wife DU Juan. The
sentence on Huang was retained at jail term of 14 years, but fines
were revised to RMB$600 million and confiscation of properties totaling RMB$200 million. For Huang's wife DU Juan, her jail term
was increased to 3 years and 6 months with fines of RMB$200
milli on. 28
In this case, HUANG Guangyu was sentenced to a jail term of
14 years, and he is currently serving the sentence. The end of this
case should serve to be the beginning of insider trading regulatory
awareness in China. The most relevant issue for this case is that it
has raised the awareness for the interest of small/medium investors
in China.
ISSUES FOR THE INVESTORS IN CHINA
After the court sentenced judgments for respective defendants
from Huang's case, we should not forget there is another important
party involved, the shareholder/investors. Shareholders are another
major party who suffered in cases such as HUANG Guangyu, as the
share price of Gome had plummeted during the period of this case.
Besides Gome shareholders, other companies involved in this case
are also public trading companies such as Yongle, San/ian Commercial and Beijing Centergate and their share prices also reacted turbuV.

26. Ibid.
27. The judgment of the second instance of Huang Guangyu case, Report. August
30, 2010. http://finanoe.sina.eom.cn/stockltshgy/index.shtml
28. People's Daily, http1/www.people.oom.cn, May 22. 12, China.
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lently during the proceeding of this case. 29 1n other words, there
should be a large number of shareholder/investors who had suffered losses under the insider trading dealings of this case. As illustrated in Huang's case, this is the infamous consequence of sheU
listing as it is usually the smalllmedium shareholders/investors that
suffer the most when insider trading occurred under sheU listing.
This is because the unfair and non-transparency of information usuaUy led the major shareholder or company controUer such as Huang
to make substantial and unlawful profit at the expense of individual
shareholders/investors.
In order to address this issue, pursuant to the Civil Procedural
Law of the People's Republic of China, the court at the domicile of
the plaintiff, i.e. shareholders who had suffered losses, shall have
jurisdiction. However, in the Huang's case, tens of thousands of
shareholders suffered losses as a result of Huang's insider trading,
and were the courts at the domicile of the plaintiffs to have jurisdiction, there would be dozens of courts around the country that
would docket the case and try the insider trading case against
Huang. Due to the differing levels of trial quality and the varying
standards applied, the results of the individual trials would differ
significantly for this new type of case involving civil compensation
for victims of insider trading, which is bad for maintaining the authority of court judgments, not to say the great waste of judicial
resources. Therefore, there should be a single court to try and exercise jurisdiction over the claim. Tentatively, the trial court of the
case could be the court at the domicile of the defendant.30
If the Beijing Second Intermediate People's Court is to have
jurisdiction over the civil compensation case for the insider trading
offence, it would facilitate the finding of facts and the safeguarding
of the legitimate interests of the investors. In light of the Huang's
case, some people suggest that as Huang has permanent domicile in
Hong Kong, and the first instance trial of the criminal case for the
insider trading offence was made by the Beijing Second Intermediate People's Court. Therefore, Beijing Second Intermediate People's Court is the most appropriate forum?'
29. Bloomberg Professional System: Bloomberg Finance LP. USA: Beijing Centergate Tecbnologie's share prioe bas plummeted from Ihe blghest of RMB$17.8 in May
2008. all the way down to RMB$2.48 on November 4. And it has 130,000 shareholders.
30. "From Final Ruling of Huang's Case to Disscuss the Issue of Civil Compensa·
tion for Insider Trading" hup:/lblog.p5w.netl?uid·382&5().action-viewspace-itemid-348
215. Janurary 29, 2011 (Interview)
31. Ibid.
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Now that we have addressed the issue of proper forum, let's
look at another important issue, i.e. plaintiffs with good standing, in
other words, which investors have the right to bring a compensation
claim? Are all shareholders who sold shares during these two periods plaintiffs with good standing?
The Securities Law of 2005 has no explicit provisions regarding
the scope of the plaintiffs, and it only provides that "where the insider trading causes losses to investors, the offender shall be held
duly liable for indemnification".32 Should the word "investor" be
given a broad meaning or a narrow meaning, does the word "investor" only include natural persons or also include victimized investment companies? If China wants to establish a more
comprehensive framework of insider trading regulation, then the
scope of qualified investors should be expanded to include victimized investment companies, because the purpose of compensation
for insider trading offenses is to indemnify the victims, and punish
the offender, and no distinction was made between natural person
and corporations.
Specifically, according to the Criminal Judgment, it was during
the period from April27, 2007 to June 27,2007 and the period from
August 13, 2007 to September 28, 2007, the two price sensitivity
periods, that Huang bought in huge amounts of Beijing Centergate
stocks. Therefore, only shareholders who sold Beijing Centergate
shares during these two periods might qualify as plaintiffs to claim
against Huang; however, not all shareholders who sold shares during these periods are plaintiffs with good standing. Only shareholders who executed reverse trading as compared to that of Huang
have good standing. It is worth stressing that "shareholders who
executed reverse trading as compared to that of an insider" include
all shareholders who executed reverse trading when the insider executed insider trading, and are not limited to counterparty to the
executed share transactions of the insider. However, as the relevant authorities have not released the relevant information about
Huang's insider trading, it is currently impossible to pinpoint the
timing of Huang's purchase of shares. In this case, investors can
analyze the trading volume of Beijing Centregate shares during
these periods, especially during the period from August 13, 2007 to
September 28, 2007 for any trading abnormality, and listed the relevant time windows, and investors who sold Beijing Centergare
32. Securities Times, China, ..Issues on the Indemnification of Insider Trading from
the Huang Guangyu Case" October 16, 2010.
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stocks during those time windows may bring an action against
Huang as a reference.'3
A. Method of Litigation

According to preliminary statistics, tens of thousands of investors are victims of Huang's insider trading. With such a large group
of plaintiffs, which method of litigation would be more appropriate? The investors could be classified by their present state of mind
as foUows: (1) investors who are unaware of their right to sue
Huang; (2) investors who are aware of such rights, but are not sure
of the probability of winning the case, and they would rather stay as
is if they could not recover losses through a lawsuit instead of incurring more litigation costs; and (3) investors who are not sure
whether they could win the case, but are engaging a lawyer to try.
The statistics show that the ratio of investors who are prepared to
bring a lawsuit never topped 0.5% of the total number of shareholders, and most investors would rather not sue.34
Investors suffered heavily as a consequence of this grave violation, then why are they choosing to waive the right of action? This
may serve to be one of the weaknesses in the litigation mechanism
in China. Pursuant to the Civil Procedural Law, where either side
to an action is comprised of two or more parties and the subject
matter of the litigation are identical or of the same type, joint litigation may be used. However, such joint litigation is only suitable
where the identities of the plaintiffs are clear-cut, and the number
of plaintiffs is relatively modest. A joint litigation could not work as
weU for such insider trading cases as the Huang's case where tens of
thousands of plaintiffs are involved.
If joint litigation may not be an effective mechanism, some suggest the adoption of class actions. Class actions is a common investor protection mechanism in the United States and does have many
advantages in bringing claims in massive tort cases, including trial
economy, which helps avoid the exorbitant costs of individual action; deterrence, the massive damages payable in a class action
helps prevent torts from occurring; protection of defendant, which
helps protect the defendant from multiple punishment and from be33. Securities Times., China, ••tssues on the Indemnification of Insider Trading from
the HUANG Guangyu Case" October 16. 2010.
34. "Civil Compensation from Insider Trading from Huang's Caes''. hnp~lteeh.
ifeng.com/ilfspe<:iaUconirolgorneloonteni·1/detaiL2010_0911812550894_1.shtml. Febru·
Bf)' 1. 2011 (lnierview).
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ing overwhelmed with answering lawsuits. However, class action
also has many shortcomings. First of all, class actions consume considerable time and costs, and in the U.S., only 8% of class actions
could be concluded within one year, and only 2% to 3% completed
the trial proceedings and a substantial part of the disputes are resolved by mediation or settlement. Second, class actions are led by
lawyers designated by the judges, and the prospect of large legal
fees often induced by the lawyers, for ulterior motives, to work with
the defendant's counsel to settle with the plaintiffs, and the judges
could not find a representative or lawyer who could truly represent
the class. Third, massive damages and the involvement of huge
amounts of resources, manpower and money often made the defendants unable to continue operations, or even file for
bankruptcy. 35
Therefore, we should not directly copy the United States version of class action as it is, rather, we should adopt the rational
elements of the class action method, and incorporate them into the
joint action method of litigation that China already has, which in
tum serves to be an effective recovery mechanism of insider trading
losses, and promote the growth of the investor interests.
Also, we may suggest the use of representative action provided
by Civil Procedural Law. However, the Several Circulars of the Supreme People's Court regarding the Trial of Civil Compensation
Cases arising from False Representations in the Securities Market
dated January 9, 2003 excluded representative action, and that is
why representative action is rarely mentioned in connection with
the trial of securities market cases. 36
However, in addressing civil compensation cases arising from
insider trading, such representative action, with indefinite number
of parties on either side is suitable in several aspects:
(I) Representative action involving an indefinite number of
participants as provided for in the Civil Procedural Law is
suitable for cases involving the same type of subject matter, with many participants the number of whom could not
be defined at the time of action. A vast majority of insider
trading compensation cases meet such conditions;
(2) Representative actions have advantages for the trial of insider trading compensation cases as the following:
3.5. LUI Jen "from OIENO Boi Wen's Case to See the CompcnsollOII got QviJ
m Otino"Otino ruoance. 2006, luue 4,
:16. Ibid.
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a. In a representative action, the court could issue public
announcements with a description of the case background and the claims, asking the right holders to register their rights and join the action, whereby truly
encompassing various disputes into one proceeding for
simultaneous resolution, which saves judicial costs and
improves litigation efficiency.
b. In a representative action, the method for the nomination of representatives are flexible, improving the likelihood of representative action, cutting the litigation
costs of the parties and avoiding the litigation burdens
of the defendant (mainly listed companies and their responsible persons).
c. The judgment in a representative action could be expanded to apply to other stakeholders of the company
involved besides shareholders who did not register their
rights, ensuring the disputes are resolved once for aU.
Therefore, the legislation should make it possible for resolu·
tion of civil compensation cases for insider trading by way of representative actions, which will help reduce litigation costs, improve
litigation efficiency and maintain justice in the lit.igation process."
B. Standard or Compensation
An American scholar, Richard Posner, believes that civil compensation for securities offences are justified for two reasons. First,
it provides incentives for victims to bring an action, because litigation is necessary in order to maintain the tort system as an effective
deterrence against misdemeanors; second, it prevents the victims
from taking excessive preventive measures. 38 This also points to
the principles for the scope of compensation for securities related
offences. first, the system is designed to provide adequate protection for the rights and interests of the investors on the basis of the
causal effect between investment losses and insider trading, and
holding and punishing the insider traders with civil liabilities, to
prevent and deter insider trading; second, there shall be appropriate limitations of compensation liability, to prevent excessive deter37. CHIN Yen Yen "Resean:b on Ctwil Compeosa1ion from Sccunlits Martel",
law and Social Oe,·elopmcnl. Cb•na. 2008. Issue 4.
38. Ricll3rd Posne.. OtiANG Yi Kang (uanslate). "The Ecooocruc Analysis of
Law" CIHna Eneydoped•a Pubhshma Company. t99?, p.246
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renee due to enormous compensation, as this will have a negative
impact on social and economic development.
Some argue that the amount of compensation to investors
should be calculated based on the earnings of the offender, for instance, in Huang's case, as of the announcement of relevant information, the book earnings of the securities accounts used by Huang
for the insider trading stood at over RMB$306 million, which
should be the amount compensated to the investors, however, this
method of calculation is not practicable for each investor and is
broad in scope.39 Therefore, the actual loss of each investor should
be the basis for calculation of compensation.
The actual losses of investors include both direct losses, such as
the losses due to the drop or rise of share prices, including relevant
commission, stamp duty and closing costs, and indirect losses, including loss of interest, legal fees, litigation costs, travel expenses
and cost of absence from work ..w The current civil compensation
regulations for violations in the securities market only stated the
defrauder's liability for compensation of direct losses of investors,
and ignored the investors' indirect losses, which is worthy of
attention.
These are the primary methods for calculation of direct losses:
(1) Actual value method: The amount of compensation is the
difference between the actual price of the trading and the
actual value of the securities at the time of such trading.
For example, if an investor bought the concerned securities
at RMB$10 per share at the time of the insider trading,
while the actual value of the securities is RMB$8 per share
at the time, the difference would be RMB$2. However,
under this method, the difficulty lies with the calculation of
the actual market value of the securities at the time of the
insider trading.
(2) Calculation based on the actual cause, under which the insider trader is responsible for compensation against securities flucruations caused by its trading activities, and that
caused by other factors is not the responsibility of the insider trader. For instance, if an investor bought the con39. "Discussion on 8 Major Problems on lhe Civil Compensation for tbe case of
HUANG Guangyu" bttp:Jifmance.jrj.oom.cnlbiz/2010/09Al713438116630.shnnl, January
23, 2011 (loterview).
40. HSIANG Yi Tsai, HU Wen Hsin & CHANG Yi "The Determination for lhe
Amount of Civil Compensation from Security Litigation" China Market Journal, Issue
52, '21X17.
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cemed securities at RMB$10 per share at the time of
insider trading, and after announcement of the inside information, the price of the securities is RMB$8 per share,
and of the RMB$2 drop in per share price of the securities,
RMB$1 is caused due to system risks, and RMB$1 is
caused due to the insider trading, the insider trader will
only be responsible for the RMB$1 caused due to their actions. The difficulties with this method are how to distinguish insider trading action from other factors.
(3) Differential price method: The amount of compensation is
equal to the difference between the trading price and the
share price at the time of announcement of the inside information or shortly after. The difficulties with this
method are that it is hard to determine the time of announcement of the inside information and a reasonable period of time shortly thereafter.41
Among the above methods of calculation, the method of actual
value is easier to use, and in practice, the actual value is determined
based on the average price over a period of time, and tend to be
adopted by courts and legislative authorities.
In Huang's case, the court used the closing price on the date of
announcement of the relevant information as the basis for calculation of the gains made by Huang, and the investors could also use
this method, i.e. the losses are calculated based on the difference
between the closing price at the date of announcement and the sale
price.
C

Evidence

The question of providing evidence for insider trading cases
has always been a tricky issue as discussed in the previous work on
An Insight into Insider Trading in Greater China, and in principle
the burden of proof could be reversed, and for special cases of insider trading, some auxiliary measures may be taken.42
In fact, many of the insider trading cases was discovered by
investigation into corporate briberies. For instance, in the Huang's
case, XIANG Huaizhu, the then vice director of the Economic
Crime Investigation Department of the Ministry of Public Security
41. YANG Feng .. Discussion on Determination for Compensation for Losses from
Insider Trading'' Jinan Academic Journal. Issue 6. 2006.
42. Greg Tzu Jan Yang '"An Insight into Insider Trading in Greater Olina" Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies. No. I - 2010(200}
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and Head of Beijing Brigade for the Securities Crime Investigation,
learned of inside information during the course of Huang's manipulation of Beijing Centergate shares, and boupt Beijing Centergate
shares in reliance of the inside information.• However during the
trial against XIANG Huaizhu before Beijing Second Intermediate
People's Court, the insider trading was not touched upon and it was
the issue of bribery being focused for Xiang.
Therefore, a reward mechanism may be adopted for reporting
of crimes, i.e. offering rewards to persons who report the offense.
In addition, the employees of relevant securities regulatory authorities may be requested to appear before the court, or to provide relevant information as a witness for the prosecution.

D. Recovery of Damages
The facts of Huang's insider trading are clear, and the evidence
is concrete, and there is no significant contention thereof, but if an
adverse judgment in the civil compensation case is rendered against
Huang, how will the recovery of damages end up? Would the once
wealthiest person in China be able to deliver the compensation, and
will the investors lose money despite their success in the case?
The investors should not be concerned with this issue, as the
relevant regulations in China provide that civil compensations have
priority over administrative and criminal fines.44 The judicial authority has confiscated the Beijing Centergate shares, over 100 million shares in total, bought by Huang and his affiliated parties,
which, at the recent average price of Beijing Centergate shares at
RMBSS per share, is valued at nearly RMB$900 million. If the
court renders a favorable ruling for the plaintiffs in the civil compensation case, the confiscated shares would be adequate to compensate the claims of the investors, therefore recovery of damages
amount would not be a concern in this case.
After years of criminal proceedings, Huang's insider trading
case is basically settled, but the civil compensation proceeding has
just begun. Huang's insider trading case is relevant as it is unprecedented in terms of the amounts, the scope and consequences, and is
an important landmark in the development of the capital market in
China. The analysis of the Huang case is not a mere analysis of the
case itself or HUANG Guangyu the person, it is actually an analysis
of the roads for safeguarding the interests of investors victimized by
43. The verdict of tbe initial trial of HUANG Gua~ case • May 18, 2010.
44. Article 207 of tbe "Security Law" and Article 14 of the "Torts Law".
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insider trading, and is a summary of the common issues in the compensation cases against insider trading, to derive from the analysis
reasonable solutions. Jurisprudence is not science, but the scientific
method could be used to analyze legal issues and arrive at a scientific solution, which is also the purpose of our analysis.
VI. CASE ON QINGDAO KINGKING
AND GUOYUAN SECURITIES
Even though the case on HUANG Guangyu had closed, insider trading cases continue to flourish in China's financial market
in recent years. Not only has the structure of the cases become
more complicated, but the scale and monetary profit involved also
exceed Huang's case. For example, the case on Qingdao Kingking
Applied Chemistry Co Ltd (Qingdao Kingking) and Guoyuan Securities should be considered a good example for insider trading
cases in the post HUANG Guangyu era. Even though Qingdao
Kingking and Guoyuan Securities are independent companies, they
are related because they are both insider trading cases committed
by the same person, SHIAO Shih Ching.

A. Backgrounds
The illegal structure for this case involves two major players,
WANG Yi and SHIAO Shih Ching. They used to be members of
China's CSRC, as CSRC was the governing body of the China security market; they use the connection and convenience of their position to gain insider information in profiting from the IPO of
Qingdao Kingking Applied Chemistry Co Ltd and the corporate restructuring of Hunan Jiuzhitang Co Ltd. They are not only profiting
for themselves, they have a group of affiliated parties to share the
profit.45
As for Shiao, his profit from insider trading on the Guoyuan
Securities had profited him more than RMB$100 million. This is a
record breaking figure for the profit received from officials on insider trading cases. In other words, Shiao had used the convenience
of his connections and position to commit two major insider trading
cases that had profited him handsomely. One is Qingdao Kingking
and the other is Guoyuan Securities. 46
45. TAN Yi Fei & CHANG Lu '"The Reality of Shiao Shih Ching's Financial Dealing" (2011) CAACNews, China, May 13, Issue 4076, Pl.
46. Ibid.
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Facts oo Qmgdao Klngking

Qingdao Kingking originally was a Chinese artifact manufacturing company with capital of only USD$200,000. As its Chairman
CHEN Sou Bing wanted his company to go public, the company
expanded its capital to RMB$31.02 million on April 10, 2011. As
Chen learned that his company does not quite qualify under the
IPO criteria and regulatory body Development and Reform Commission rejected its IPO application, be approached the owner of
Tianching Ying Shun, WANG Lai for assistance. Wbo is WANG
Lai? He is CSRC vice chairman WANG Yi's brother. Due to his
brother's position in CSRC. WANG Lai and his sister WANG Wei
established Tianching Ying Shun on June 28, 2001 to provide technology development and investment consulting services with capital
of RMB$5 million.47 The consulting services they provided usually
focused on solving problems for companies who have troubles in
qualifying or fulfilling CSRC's regulations or requirements. They
will help these companies resolve their problems with CSRC using
convenient and creative ways. On the other hand, they charge a
handsome fee for sharing profits on IPOs from these companies.
As the sibling of Wang's family had engaged in a profiting
framework, WANG Lai and WANG Wei used WANG Yi's position
to attract business and WANG Yi used his sibli.n g's company as a
window to receive money from tbe corporate sectors. For example,
during the period of November 1999 to February 2008, WANG Yi
had received a bribe of RMB$6.3 million from businessman CHOU
Hong Ching in return for Chou's convenience in receiving credit
line from the banks. This amount was received by WANG Lai for
his brother. As WANG Yi became the vice chairman of CSRC in
November 1995, he recommended SHIAO Shih Ching join the
board of CSRC as deputy director - general of department of listed
company supervision in 1996. Before that, Shiao was only a lecturer
in the College for officers for Central Fmancial Administration and
was new to the financial industry.48
In 2006 Qingdao Kingking was having difficulties fulfilling the
requirements for IPO, the chairman of Qingdao Kingking sought
assistance from WANG Lai to resolve the difficulties for him.
WANG Lai approached Shiao to do this favor for him. Even
though at that time, Shiao bad already left the CSRC board to be47. Ibid.

.a. lbiil.
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come the Chairman of Galaxy Securities, but his connections on the
board were still intact.
To the market's surprise and with significant assistance from
Shiao, the next day it was announced that the case for Qingdao
Kingking IPO was passed and successfully IPO by December 2006
on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. On one afternoon on December
2006, WANG Lai had given a gift of cash RMB$200,000 to Shiao
for his assistance and this gift was later presented as evidence of
bribery that Shiao received in this case.49
C. Fads on Guoyuan Securities
During Shiao's days as CSRC's deputy director- general of department of listed company supervision, he learned on 2004 that
China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) planned to restructure
its public tracling subsidiary into an integrated public company. By
2006, Shiao left CSRC and became the chairman in Galaxy Securities. By that time, Galaxy Securities was acting as financial consultant for Sinopec on the IPO of its subsicliaries. As a result, Shiao
used this convenience to obtain knowledge on the timetable and
information for the IPO. By September 2006, he confirmed that Sinopac will use Everbright Securities Company Limited as a shell
(shell listing) for Sinopac subsidiary Beijing Huaer Company Lim·
ited to IPO. Once this IPO method was confirmed, Shiao used his
friends and family members as dummy accounts to buy stock of
Beijing Huaer Company Limited for the amount of RMB$35 mil·
lion or 430,000 shares between September 21 and 30, 2006.
On March 14, 2007, Beijing Huaer Company Limited confirmed to IPO under Everbright Securities and it will change its
name to Guoyuan Securities. On October 30, the first trading day of
Guoyuan Securities, its stock rallied 400% to as high as RMB$50
and closed at RMB$47.53. This IPO rally had made Shiao a profit
of around RMB$100 million and the court later demanded Shiao
and his family members to return profits of RMB$72.5 million as
unlawful profits. 50

D. Judgments
The scope and amount of this case were both record high in
China's financial market and Wang and Shiao bluntly using their
position and connection in CSRC as a convenient mechanism for
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.

INSIDER 'TRADING IN CHINA

25

profit had attracted attention from the Chinese regulator. On June
8, 2008 WANG Yi (CSRC ex-Vice Chairman) was taken into custody by Serious Crimes Squad for investigation. On April 29, 2009,
SHIAO Shih Ching, the CEO of Galaxy Securities was under investigation and the investigation focused on his connections with the
corporate companies and the securities market during his two terms
as member of the CSRC board. By the end of April 2010, WANG
Yi was sentenced to death parole for receiving bribes of RMB$11.9
million by Henan Province People's High Court. By the end of
April 2011, SHIAO Shih Ching was sentenced to death parole for
bribery and insider trading at Fmal Instance by Henan Province
People's High Court. Shiao was guilty for RMB$15.46 million of
bribery and insider trading profit of RMB$100 million and return
profit of RMB$72.5 million as unlawful profits. 5 1

E- Issues from the Cases
From these cases, we can see the biggest problem that leads to
the insider trading dealing is the existence of the "amphibian" like
Shiao and Wang who move between government regulatory bodies
and securities fi.rms. Unfortunately, they are not the only ones. According to a press survey, there are 28 fund managers in Chinese
securities firms who used to work in the CSRC. 52 They move between their roles to serve their own interest. On one band, they
relax regulations and convenience to IPO for their related companies and on the other hand, they and their faniily members profit
from the capital market from the insider information. This amphibian role allows them to gain unlawful profit from the insider information they obtain as regulatory officials.
Unfortunately, in a healthy and mature capital market, these
amphibians are not allowed to exist. Their mere existence opened
an unfair window in the market and made the capital market imperfect and unhealthy. U China wants its capital market to become one
of the major financial markets in the word like the United States
and Japan, they should provide restrictions in regulating officials
who retire or leave CSRC. There should be clear "revolving door
policies" in restricting ex-CSRC officials to work in securities companies. Also, providing "revolving door policies" is not enough, enforcing them is the key. Without effective enforcement and
punishment, all regulations will become a mere formality. The amSl. Ibid.
S2. Ibid.
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phibian problem will continue to exist and the market will continue
to be unfair.

F. Issue on Shell Listing
Besides the amphibian problem, another problem which
emerged from the cases above was shell-borrowing listing. Shell listing is a common practice in China especially for Chinese companies
to be listed in the Hong Kong or other stock market. This may be a
convenient practice for the company to raise capital in the public
market, but this practice also provides many loopholes for gaining
insider information and room for insider dealing. As a result, the
issue of shell listing will be closely examined and discussed as it is at
present a special characteristic for insider trading cases in China.

1.

What is Shell-borrowing Listing?

The mechanism of shell listing is often adopted when a Chinese
company wants to be listed in their local or overseas stock market,
and choose not to list directly but to buy or borrow the shell of
another public trading company in that market. There are two major types of shell listing. There is the shell-borrowing listing and
shell-making listing.
a. Shell-borrowing Listing
The Chinese company usually chooses an existing listed company to "borrow" the shell of that company in order to achieve the
goal of raising capital in the market. The Chinese company will usually purchase the equity of the borrowed company in order to become the major holder of the company. After they gain control or
purchase the company, they use the company as a shell for public
listing. Usually after they purchase the company, they will inject
their own assets into the shell company and achieve their ultimate
goal of public listing.'3 Aside from acquiring a separate corporate
entity for listing, shell borrowing could occur within the corporate
group. In other words, a parent company could use one if its subsidiaries as a shell for listing. The parent company will inject assets and
capital into the shell subsidiary and restructure it into a holding
53. ZHANG Yu, "Sample Analysis and Law Regulation to the Coming into Market
or the Chinese En1erprises Through Sbeii·Borrowing Overseas" Journal or Hebei Uni·
versity of Economics and Trade. Vol. 21. No. 4, July 2000.
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company and in turn help the parent company go public as a
whole.54
There are a few advantages for shell borrowing listing. First of
all, this method is fast and convenient for the companies compared
with standard IPO listing procedure for Chinese companies. This is
because according to The Securities Law of The People's Republic
of China, there are a list of strict requirements for IPO listing on
market capital, ratio of public issued shares, number of shareholders and financial performance." On the other hand, if they want to
be a listed company and choose a listed shell company, they can
avoid all the above requirements and achieve their purpose for listing quickly. As a result, shell listing provides a convenient back
door for companies who want to be publicly listed but cannot fulfill
the requirements for listing under the Securities Law. Also, if a
company chooses to follow standard IPO procedure, the whole process until public listing could take around 18 months. On the other
hand, even though shell listing requires complicated financial restructuring between the parent and shell com,rany, it usually will
take around 6 months to complete till listing.'
Secondly, the cost to be listed is lower for a second offering of
the shell company compared with IPO listing. In order to protect
the interests of the investing public, the Securities Law set up
higher thresholds on the cost of IPO listing. The to-be listed company has to provide a series of expenses from listing preparation to
actual listing. On the other hand, the cost for a second offering on
the restructured shell company is much lower than the IPO listing.
This has become another important incentive for companies to
choose shelllisting.57
Thirdly, this method could also be used to avoid the problem
of a difference in accounting methods between Chinese companies
and overseas markets. As a result, this method has become a popular listing mechanism for Chinese comganies to be listed in Hong
Kong and New York Stock Exchange.'
S4. ZHAO Lei, "Research on Legal Risk Control of Back-door Usting", Journal of
Anhui Vocational CoUege of Police Officers, General No. S4, Vol.10, No.3, 2011.
SS. The Security Law of PRC. sections for !PO listing.
S6. ZHAO LeL "Research on Legal Risk Control of Back-door Usting",Joumal of
Anhui Vocational CoUege of Police Officers, General No. S4, Vol.10, No. 3, 2011.
S1. Ibid.
S8. ZHANG Yu, "Sample Analysis and Law Regulation to the Coming into Market
of the Olinese Enterprises Througll SheD-Borrowing Overseas" Journal of Hehei University of Economics and Trade, Vol. 21, No. 4,July 2000.
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From the advantages mentioned above, shell listing seems to
be a win-win solution for both shell and borrowing company. This is
because the potential shell companies are usually public traded
companies that are inactive, have low transparency and low future
visibility, the injection of new assets and capital into the shell company provided them with an opportunity to get rid of problematic
old assets and restructure its own financial structure.59 Also, there
is also a potential bid rally on the shares of the shell company. This
is also an opportunity for existing shareholders of the shell company to get rid of their non-performing old investment and profit in
the market. On the other hand, as the cases mentioned above, this
bid rally will also become a potential opportunity for insider trading
to occur. This is also the reason that gives shell listing a bad name.
According to the advantages mentioned above, there are a few
successful cases under shell listing. The following are a few popular
examples:
- In February, 1990, the Hong Kong subsidiary of China International Trust and Investment Corporation (Citic Group),
Citic Hong Kong wanted to be listed in the Hong Kong stock
market through shell listing, so they acquired 43 o/o equity of
Taifu Development Co Ltd an existing listed company in
Hong Kong and to be newly listed asCitic Pacific in January
1991. After the purchase, the parent company Citic Group
continued to inject capital into this company and made it
become one of the 33 members in the Hong Kong Heng
Sang Index.
- In October, 1992, Chinese State Owned Enterprise, Shogang
Group and Hong Kong company Cheung Kong (Holdings)Limited in joint venture to acquire a Hong Kong listed
company Tung Wing Steel Holdings Limited. Afterward,
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited transferred most of its
Tung Wing Steel Holdings Limited's shareboldings to Shogang Group and the company was renamed to Shougang
Concord International Enterprises Company Limited. This
not only enabled Shogang Group to be listed in Hong Kong
market, but the capital gain on Tung Wing Steel Holdings
Limited from HKD$0.928 to HKD$2.77, bad enabled Shogang Group to acquire this shell without using its own cash.
Not only that, this shell borrowing listing enabled Shogang
59. ZHAO Lei, "Re$earch on Legal Risk Control of Back-door Usliog". Journal of
Anhui Voca1ional College of Police Officel"li. General No. 54. Voi.IO. No.3, 201 I.
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Group to acquire HKD$1.8 billion in cash. The huge success
for Shogang Group had become a success story for shell borrowing listing and became a huge temptation for Chinese
companies who wanted to be listed in Hong Kong.60
On the other hand, besides the advantages and success stories
mentioned above, there are also disadvantages of shell-borrowing
listing. First of all, the cost of buying a shell may be unpredictable.
Even though the expense on second offering is lower than IPO listing, the cost of actually acquiring the shell of a listed company
could be much higher than normal listing. For example, if the news
of shell borrowing-being spread in the market, the share price of
the shell could rally and increase the cost of shell purchases. Also,
the risk of shell- borrowing listing could be much higher than normal listing. This is because Chinese companies usually not familiar
with overseas market such as Hong Kong. Even though they have
underwriters in the securities companies in helping them to choose
target shell companies and undergoing comprehensive evaluations,
there is still a risk that they purchase a problematic shell company.
When they purchase a problematic company, they are not only unable to be listed successfully, they even have to undertake the unwanted liabilities of the shell company.
As a problem with shell-borrowing emerges gradually, China
CSRC in February, 1994 introduced The paper in relation to exam
and approval domestic enterprise issuing stock in overseas market.
This indicated that when Chinese companies want to be listed overseas, it has to be approved by the State Council Securities Commission, or else shell-borrowing listed will not be allowed. 61 As
regulations for shell-borrowing listing become stricter and companies can be chosen as a shell become scarcer, Chinese companies
are choosing a new revised method of shell listing: shell-making
listing.
b. Shell-making Listing
Shell-making listing occurred when Chinese companies registered a newly formed company in the market planned to be listed
or in a third region. The new company could either be solely owned
60. ZHANG Yu, "Sample Analysis and Law Regulation to tbe Coming into Market
of the Chinese Enterprises Through Shell-Borrowing Overseas" Journal of Hebei University of Eonnomics and Trade, Vol. 21, No.4, July 2000.
61. ZHANG Yu, "Sample Analysis and Law Regulatioo to lhe Coming into Market
ol the Olinese Enterprises Through Shell-Borrowing Overseas" Journal of Hebei Uni·
versity of Economics and Trade, Vol. 21, No.4, July 2000.
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or jointly owned by the Chinese company as a holding company.
For example, a Chinese company may form a solely or jointly
owned holding company in a third region such as Bermuda, Cayman Island or British Virgin Island. In return, this holding will
purchase the shares of the Chinese company as its holding company
and this holding company can choose a desired market to be listed
such as Hong Kong. During the process of shell making, choosing
which place to be registered depends on the rules and regulation of
the market they plan to be listed.62
As shell-making has also become a popular method for Chinese companies to raise capital from a public market. Shell-making
has its advantages as well. The advantages are:
- Shell-making listing has lower cost and lower risk compared
with shell-borrowing. This is because the company does not
need to take the risk of buying a problematic shell company.
Also, the cost to register a new company in a third region
should be much lower than purchasing the shares of a shell
company.
- Since China's own accounting, auditing and legal standards
are generally different to international standards; registering
the new company in a third overseas region ensures that it
will be accepted by the market it planned to be listed. 63
On the other hand, there are also disadvantages to shell-making listing. First of all, the Chinese company needs to use a significant amount of capital to remit to overseas to establish the new
company. This may be a huge financial burden for the company.
Second, is time consumption, as it may take a few years from company register to public listing in the overseas market. This is because the regulatory authority of the listing market usually requires
companies registered in places such as Cayman Island or BVI to be
operated for a few years before they qualify for public listing. This
is used to avoid a paper company becoming a public listed
company.64

G.

Problems Arise from Shell Listing

As illustrated from by the above analysis, Chinese companies
need mechanisms such as shell listing as a convenient means for
them to raise capital in the public or overseas public market. Also,
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
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the standard for shell listing is much lower than formal IPO listing.
As it is much easier for the company to acquire a shell company,
inject capital and restructure the company and IPO the shell company than to follow all the formal IPO listing standards by
themselves.
On the other hand, the widely used shell listing such as cases
mentioned above does lead to some problems. The problems are as
follows:
- Legal and regulatory problem: Chinese companies are often
unfamiliar with overseas legal systems, regulations and lack
experience in dealing with overseas legal regulators. This
could create huge losses or even lead to complete failure
during the shell-borrowing or making process.
- Higher than market cost: During the process of shell listing,
Chinese companies may spend too much capital on purchasing or making the shell that may lead to a shortage of its own
operating capital and create a problem with its own operation. This may occur when a Chinese company may use a
huge amount of money to bid for a shell company. For example, the potential shell companies in Hong Kong are usually public traded companies that are inactive, bas low
transparency and low future visibility company with very low
share price. With shell listing becoming a popular listing
method for Chinese companies to list in Hong Kong, the potential shell companies in Hong Kong are becoming popular
targets for Chinese companies. There may be a few Chinese
companies who have become active bidders for those potential shell companies and its shares rally to be much higher
than its fair value. As a result, when the Chinese company
finally gets the shell company, the bidding process may make
it pay a few more times on the share prices than its fair market value.
- Dual accounting book: When a Chinese company finally creates the listed shell companies, the shell company usually bas
two sets of accounting books. As for a shell listed company
in Hong Kong, an outer accounting book is kept to fuJfill the
accounting and auditing requirement of Hong Kong regulators. An inner accounting book is the actual accounting book
that records the actual financial and operating activities of
the company. The existence of two accounting books might
create the opportunity of a loophole for operating and man-
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agement officers to transfer capital and assets for their own
interest or room for accounting fraud and corruption.
- Legal control on assets: There is lack of comprehensive legal
regulations to monitor the assets of Chinese companies in
the listed shell company. This is because some of the Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong are state owned enterprises. When they are listed in Hong Kong through shell
listing, Chinese stated owned assets sometimes are being
transferred to private hands without any legal regulation to
monitor.65
- Window of opportunity for insider trading to occur: As the
shares of potential shell companies may rally as Chinese
companies actively bid for their control, this is becoming an
opportunity for insider trading to occur. As mentioned
above, the shares of potential shell companies are mostly inactively traded and low valuation, the bid rally makes this
type of companies to be attractive targets for insider trading.
The insiders are usually major stakeholders of the deal such
as securities underwriters and major shareholders of the potential shell companies or bidding companies are usually the
insider to acquire firsthand information of the potential bid.
They can easily make a handsome profit in the market by
trading during the bid rally. This is being illustrated during
the case of Huang and Shiao. Once the stakeholders on the
deal acknowledge on the bid, they can easily leak the information to their friends and relatives to profit from the deal.
H. Remedies and Regulations Cor Shell Listing:

1. Remedies
Despite all the problems illustrated above for shell listing, shell
listing indeed is an effective and convenient resolution for Chinese
companies to list in the public market, especially in overseas capital
markets. In order to utilize the advantages of shell listing and avoid
its related problems, there are a few points which need to be focused on in order to provide a remedy for the problem on shell
listing.
- careful selection of potential shell company: When a company decides to choose shell listing as their method of listing,
65. ZHAO Lei, "Research on Legal Risk Control of Back-door Listing", Journal of
Anhui Vocational College of Police Officers, General No. 54, Vol.lO. No.3. 2011.
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they should choose the appropriate potential shell company
carefully. They should choose a shell company which will not
only provide them with a shell. but also provide them with
the operational and financial resources they needed. They
sbould choose a shell that could maximize their benefits on
their capital structure for public listing.
- Limiting on related parties trades: According to The Usting
Rules of Shanghai and Sheozhen Stock Exchange, related
parties transaction means the transactions that related legal
persons, related natural persons and potential related parties
bad transfer resources in order to directly or indirectly gain
control over a public company or its holding subsidiaries.
During the shell listing process, the unlisted company gains
equity and control of a public listing shell company either
t.h rough equity exchange, resources exchange should be considered a related parties transaction. Hence, it should be regulated and governed by regulations in the stock exchange on
related party transaction. If regulated effectively, it could be
used to avoid unlawful profit to occur as the unlisted company gaining control of the public company and using their
position of control to exchange their low quality asset with
more valuable asset of the public shell company in order to
strip the asset of the shell company.66
- Protect the interests of smallfmdividual shareholders/investors: Due to un-equivalent of information, small investors
usually become the victims of the controlling/major shareholder's profit taking. On the other hand, it is important that
the interests of small/individual investors' interest should be
addressed and protected. This is because:
1. D ue to the defects of the financial market. this often leads
to unfair informat.i on and major shareholders controlling
the board of directors. As a result. the small investors
have no voice or control in the capital market. Their interests are often being overlooked.
2. Small and individual investors are an important part of
capital resources for the company's survival. A public
company can not only survive on major shareholder and
without help from small investors.

66. Ibid.
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3. To protect the interests of small investors is important to
the prosperity and stability of a financial market.67
- Establish a complete and competent relevant information
disclosure system: A complete and competent information
disclosure system is the fundamental requirement to protect
the small individuaVinvestor's rights to relevant financial in·
formation. The Section 86 of the current Security Law of
PRC, with the 5% threshold for relevant information disclosure. Unfortunately, with the current capital market conditions and increase in liquidity of the stock market, the 5%
threshold may not be enough. As a result, China can take
the example of U.S. with the disclosure of 5% and +1-1%
will be required for disclosure.68
2.

Regulations

In another words, regulations targeted on shell listing mechanism are indeed needed in order to avoid problems related to shell
listing to emerge. As a result, starting on September 1, 2011, CSRC
declared the formal implementation of the Decision on Revising the
Relevant Provisions on Major Asset Reorganization and Supporting
Financing for Listed Companies or "the decision". According to the
decision, it not only clearly specified the scope and method of su·
pervision for shell listing; it also introduced additional requirements
on Administrative Measures for Material Assets Reorganization of
Listed Companies. This is used to introduce specific requirements
for operation management, operation timing and profit management on shell companies. For example, the decision has raised the
threshold for asset restructuring on shell listing. The decision speci·
fied the company should operate and manage the shell company
continuously for more than 3 years and the shell company should
operate at a profit of more than RMB$20million for more than two
consecutive accounting years. According to the requirement of
2006. Opinions on the Application of Securities and Futures Lows
for normal IPO, the listing company should operate at a profit of
more than RMB$30million for more than three consecutive accounting years. In other words, after the implementation of the de67. CHOW Olin Yen "The Prol«tioo for SllllllVMedium lnveslors under SbeU
Llstmg Process- Otiua Academoc Journal Etec:troruc Publosluns House. http://www.
enkl.nct. 2011. Mardi.
68. lbul.
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ctSton, the standard for shell listing is becoming close to the
standard of normal IPO listing. 69
In order to avoid the occurrence of related parties transaction
and insider trading related to shell listing, CSRC decided to issue a
series of decisions such as the Release of Suggestions on Strengthening the Supervision of Listed Companies, the Notification on the
Regulation on Major Purchase or Selling of Large Assets buy Listed
Companies, the Administrative Measures for the Takeover of Listed
Companies, Measures for the Administration of Disclosure of Shareholder Equity Changes of Listed Companies, Administrative Measures for Material Assets Reorganization of Listed Ccmpanies,
Regularizing the Information Disclosure of Listed Companies and
Behaviors of Relevant Parties.70 This series of regulations and decisions are used to focus on the related parties and insider trading
problems on shell listing that are detrimental to the market competence and investor confidence in the stock market.
This is the first time China's regulators introduced regulations
that focused on regulating shell listing. Before "the decisions" were
introduced, the listing standards for shell listing were much lower
than standard IPO. As a result, when a company purchased a shell
company, they can inject capital and restructure the financial structure of the shell company in a short period of time. As the process
of restructuring and chain of decision is often complicated, it is easy
to hide illegal activities such as insider trading and related partiesdealing during the process."
On the other hand, as the introduction of "the decision" made
the requirement for shell listing stricter and increased the transparency for shell listing, it is also likely to reduce shell listing in the
future and encourage Chinese companies to follow the formal standards of IPO listing. Even though insider trading often related to
shell bidding and listing, but there are indeed some advantages related to shell listing and it is unlikely that the shell listing mechanism will disappear in the financial market. As a result, the
69. LU Bing "Shell Listing Required Stricter and More Comprehensive Regulations'' CapiJal and Law, Olin a Academic Journal Electronic Pubtishing House, http://
www.cnki.net, 2011, September.
70. ZHAO Lei, "Research on Legal Risk Control of Back-door Listing", Journal of
Anhui Vocational College of Pntioe Offioers, General No. S4. Vol.lO, No. 3, 2011.
11. LU Bing "Shell Usting Required Stricter and More Comprehensive Regulations" Capital and Law, China Acadentic Journal Electronic Pubtishing House, http://
www.cnki.ne~ 2011, September.
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regulator should provide effective regulations for this mechanism
rather than limiting it to occur.
VII. INSIDER TRADING IN THE U.S.A
In the United States and several other jurisdictions, trading
conducted by corporate officers, key employees, directors, or signif·
icant shareholders (in the U.S., defined as beneficial owners of ten
percent or more of the firm's equity securities) must be reported to
the regulator or publicly disclosed, usually within a few business
days of the trade. Many investors follow the summaries of these
insider trades in the hope that mimicking these trades will be profitable. While "legal" insider trading cannot be based on material
non·public information, some investors believe corporate insiders
may have better insight into the health of the company or its financial performance. As a result, their trades may convey important
information. On the other hand, the existence of legal insider trading has always been considered to be a grey area as it is only one
line to consider being legal or illegal concerning insider trading.
A. Dlegal
What attracted the concern of legal authorities or the financial
market is the existence of illegal insider trading. R ules against insider trading on material non-public information exist in most juris·
dictions around the world, though the details and the efforts to
enforce them vary considerably. In the United States, insider trading is regulated by Sections 16(b) and lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which directly and indirectly addresses the
issue. Congress enacted this act after the stock market crash of
1929.72 The United States is generally viewed as the one of the first
and having the strictest laws against illegal insider trading, and
makes the most serious efforts to enforce them.
1.

Definilion of "insider"

In the United States and Germany, for mandatory reporting
purposes, company insiders are defined as a company's officers, directors and any beneficial owners of more than ten percent of a
class of the company's equity securities. Trades made by these types
of insiders in the company's own stock, based on material non-public information, are considered to be fraudulent since the insiders
72. Speech by SEC Staff: Insider Trading • A U.S. Perspt!ctive"' by Thomas C.
Newkirk. Associate Director, Division of Enforcement (September 1998)
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are violating the fiduciary duty that they owe to the shareholders.
The corporate insider, simply by accepting employment, bas undertaken a legal obligation to the shareholders to put the shareholders'
interests before their own, in mailers related to the corporation.
When the insider buys or sells based upon company owned information, he or she is violating hislher obligation to the shareholders.73 For example, illegal insider trading would occur if the chief
executive officer of Company A learned (prior to a public announcement) that Company A will be taken over, a.nd bought
shares in Company A knowing that the share price would likely
rise.
In the United States and many other jurisdictions, however,
"insiders" are not just limited to corporate officials and major
shareholders where illegal insider trading is concerned, but can include any individual who trades shares based on material non-public information in violation of some duty of trust. This duty may be
imputed; for example, in many jurisdictions, in cases of where a
company insider "tips" a friend about non-public information likely
to have an effect on the company's share price, the duty the company insider owes the company is now imputed to the friend and
the friend violates a duty to tbe company if he or she trades on the
basis of this information. For example in the case of Rajaratnam
and Gupta, Gupta as director of Goldman Sachs was found to be
guilty of insider trades as he tips his friend Rajaratnam of Goldman
Sachs's earnings result before this information is released to the
public.

2.

Misappropriation theory

A newer view of insider trading, the "misappropriation theory," is now part of U.S. law. It states that anyone who misappropriates (stea.ls) information from their employer and trades on that
information in ANY stock (either the employer's stock or the company's competitor stocks) is guilty of insider trading_?• For example,
if a fund manager who worked for Company B learned about the
takeover of Company A while performing his work duties, and
bought stock in Company A personally, illegal insider trading might
still have occurred. Even though the fund manager did not violate a
fiduciary duty to Company A's shareholders, he might have vio73. Wikipedia on Insider Tr.chna: bllp~lea.wil:ipedia.ors/"'•killnsidcr_tt11din&
74 Larry Harris, Tr.chna 4 Eu:Jun&cs, Orlonl Press, Oxford, 2003. Olapler 29
"IMKkr Tradiog" p. 586-587
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lated a fiduciary duty to Company B's shareholders (assuming the
investment fund bad a policy of not allowing fund manager to trade
for themselves).

3. Proof of responsibility
Proving that someone has been responsible for a trade can be
difficult, because traders may try to bide behind nominees, offshore
companies, and other proxies. Nevertheless, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) prosecute over 50 cases each year,
with many being settled administratively out of court.7 .1 The SEC
and several stock exchanges actively monitor trading, looking for
suspicious activity.
B. The Insider Trading Law of the U.S.A.
As United States has been the leading country in prohibiting
insider trading made on the basis of material non-public information. Thomas Newkirk and Melissa Robertson of the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission summarize the development of U.S. in·
sider trading Jaws. Insider trading bas a base offense level of 8,
which puts it in Zone A under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. This
means that first-time offenders are eligible to receive probation
rather than incarceration. 76

Common Law
U.S. insider trading prohibitions are based on English and
American common law prohibitions against fraud. In 1909, well
before the Securities Exchange Act was passed, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that a corporate director who bought that
company's stock when he knew it was about to jump up in price
committed fraud by buying while not disclosing his inside
information.
Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 contained prohibitions
of fraud in the sale of securities which were greatly strengthened by
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits short-swing profits (from any
purchases and sales within any six month period) made by corporate directors, officers, or stockholders owning more than 10% of a
firm's shares. Under Section lO(b) of the 1934 Act, SEC Rule lObS, prohibits fraud related to securities trading.
1.

15. Wikipedia on IIISlder Trad•ng; http~/en.wikipedla.org/Wtkillnsider_trading
76. u.s.s.G. f2BI.4
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The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 provide for
penalties for illegal insider trading to be as high as three times the
profit gained or the loss avoided from the illegal trading.
SEC regulation FD ("Fair Disclosure") requires that if a company intentionally discloses material non-public information to one
person, it must simultaneously disclose that information to the public at large. In the case of an unintentional disclosure of material
non-public information to one person, the company must make a
public disclosure "promptly."77lnsider trading, or similar practices,
are also regulated by the SEC under its rules on takeovers and
tender offers under the Williams Act.78
The most recent development in regulating the insider trading
is the Dodd-Frank Act. This act was passed on July 31 2011 focusing
on financial regulations and insider trading activities in the postglobal financial crisis world. The Act changes the existing regulatory structure, such as creating a host of new agencies in an effort to
streamline the regulatory process, increasing oversight of specific
institutions regarded as a systemic risk, amending the Federal Reserve Act and promoting transparency. The Act purports to provide
rigorous standards and supervision to protect the economy and
American consumers, investors and businesses and to end taxpayer
funded bailouts of financial institutions, claim to provide for an advanced warning system on the stability of the economy, creates
rules on executive compensation and corporate governance, and
eliminates some loopholes that led to the 2008 economic recession.
Under this Act, important new agencies created include Financial
Stability Oversight Council, the Office of Financial Research and
the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. Of the existing agencies, changes are proposed ranging from new powers to the transfer
of powers in an effort to enhance the regulatory system. On the
other hand, even though the Act was being passed, but the implementation details of this Act was still in discuss with various financial participants such as SEC, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)
and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 79

77. Larry Harris, Trading & Exchanges, Oxford Press, Oxford, 2003. Chapter 29
"Insider Trading" p. 591-597
78. bttp://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Williams_Act
79. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

40

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Vru. THE lNSIDER TRADING CASES OF RAJARATNAM,
GOFFER AND GUYfA
Besides, laws and regulations, much of the developments of in·
sider trading law bas resulted from court decisions. U.S. securities
regulators initiated a crackdown on insider trading activities since
2007. As a result, the most significant developments are the cases
on Rajaratnam, Goffer and Gupta. These three cases are compli·
cated and inter-related, but their convictions are considered one of
the most important victories of financial regulator against insider
trading.

A. Fllds
On October 16, 2009, United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) sued Raj Rajaratnam for engaging in insider
trading. Also, Rajaratnam, the billionaire founder of Galleon
Group was among six people who were arrested and charged in a
US$20 million insider trading scheme under federa l prosecution.
Besides Rajaratnam, prosecutors also arrested Rajiv Goel, director
in Intel Capital strategic investments, Anil Kumar, director at McKinsey & Co., mM Corp executive Robert Moffat, DanieUe Cbiesi
and Mark Kurland, fund manager at New Castle Partners.80 Federal
investigation had this case for more than two years in the making
and among the biggest undercover operations in insider trading. By
November 6, 2009, US prosecutors charged another fourteen people, including hedge fund managers, lawyers and ex-Galleon Group
employees with method dealing with drug dealers and common
criminals as they profited on insider data from deals involving firms
such as 3Com Corp and Alliance Data System Corp. These additional charges had brought the combine illegal profits in these cases
from US$20 million to as much as US$53 million."
The investigation did not stop by the unraveling of these two
insider trading rings. By March 2010, the prosecutors were exBnlining the trades in Goldman Sachs shares by Rajaratnam. The former
Goldman Sachs board member, Raj at Kumar Gupta was also being
examined and later arrested as he was a onetime business partner
with Rajaratnam. Gupta was a board member of Goldman Sachs
since November 2006 and only ceased to be on the board three days
1<0. David Glovio. Kathenne Bunon & David Sebeer "Golloen's Rajaratnam
Charged tn Bigges1 Hedge Sehcme" Bloomberg, L.P: Oel. 16. 2009.
81 . Oa>id Glovin. Bob Van Vons & Joshua GaUu "Hedge Fund Managers. Traders
Chorged tn Galleon Tradtng Probe" Bloomberg, LP, No, ember 6. 2009.
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before the prosecutor announced their investigation."' On Oct. 26,
2011 Gupta was charged with 5 counts of securities fraud and one
count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud.113 The SEC filed its
lawsuit the same day, accusing G upta of engaging in an extensive
insider trading scheme with Rajaratnam.84 On June 15,2012, Gupta
was found guilty of securities fraud and conspiracy. Securities fraud
carries a maximum prison sentence of 20 years and conspiracy carries a five year maximum..._.
Rajaratnam faces 13 fraud and conspiracy counts and many
carry 20-year maximum sentences. On October 13,2011 be was sentenced to 11 years in prison for insider trading... He was also ordered by the federal judge to pay US$92.8 million for the case
brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).81
The six defendants were charged with using insider trading information in the above two overlapping schemes to trade shares of companies including Google Inc., Polycom Inc., Hilton I lotels Corp and
Advanced Micro Devices Inc (AMD). They were arrested under
the insider trading scheme as trading tips to Rajaratnam since 2006
came from insiders and others at hedge funds, investor relations
fm:ns, and companies including Intel, ffiM, McKinsey, and companies whose shares were traded in the scheme. Under this scheme.
Rajaratnam and his firm had earned around $23 million from the
fraud.88

8 . Rajaratnam: October 16, 2009
This is a case of hedge fund insider trading as Rajaratnam
founded Galleon in January 1997 and focusing on technology and
health-care stocks. Galleon had grown to US$5 billion in 2001 and
82. Jolm Helyar. Mehul Sm101a,.. & David Gkwin "Goldman s.dlo Director
Gupto DealJ .,.;th Rajaratnam" Bloomber&o l..P, April 22, 2010.
83. U.S. v. Gupta. 11-a-00907. U.S. Oi3trict Court lor Soutbem 0.111<1 ol New
York (Manhattan).
84. SEC v. Gupta, tt-cv.()7566, U.S. District Court lor tbc Southern District ol New
York (Maobattao)
8S. U.S. v. Gupta, ll·cr-00907, U.S. District Court for Southern District of New
York (Maohattao).
86. U.S. v. Rajaratnam, ~. U.S. District Court, Southern DISirict or New
York (Moobattan).
87. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 09-cv-8811. U.S. District Court. Soulh<m Dutrict of New
York (MoohattaD).
88. David Glovio. Bob Van Vono a JOibu.o Ganu ·Hedac Fun.J M...,..., Traders
<:'harpS m Galleoo Tradins Probe" Bloomberc. L-P. NO\'Ctnber 6. 2009.
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US$8 billion when Rajaratnam was arrested.89 This rapid growth in
fund size was the result of Rajaratnam engaging in insider trading
schemes. As indicated by the SEC, Rajaratnam had cultivated a
network of high-ranking corporate executives and insiders and
tapped into this ring to obtain confidential details about quarterly
earnings and takeover activities.90
Prosecutors started to investigate this case in 2007 and a person
working in Galleon had pleaded guilty and cooperated with the
prosecutor by indicating that Rajaratnam used insider information
tips to trade since 2006. Prosecutors bad used telephone recordings
and cell phone interception to provide evidence indicated that
Rajaratnam instructed colleagues to create e-mails designed to hide
his source of information and make trades to mask his illegal
activities. 91
Evidence indicated that Rajaratnam had traded in 2006 and
2007 on leaks from insiders at Polycom, Moody's investors Services
Inc and Market Street Partners. For example, a Moody's analysts
offered news about Hilton and a Market Street Partners source provided tips about Google. Rajaratnam earned US$12.7 million on
the leaks and gave a confidential government informant inside information on other companies in return. 92
/.

Intel

One of the six people arrested, Rajiv Goel, director in Intel
Capital strategic investments, had passed news about Intel's investment in Clearwire Corp and enabled Rajaratnam to make a profit
of about US$579,000. ln return, Rajaratnam placed profitable
trades for the benefit of Goel in a personal brokerage account in
Charles Schawb.9J

2. Trading Ring Scheme:
Another tipping ring involved three other defendants, Robert
Moffat, Danielle Cbiesi and Mark Kurland. Chiesi a Bear Stearns
veteran got secret tips from her source in Akamai Technologies Inc.
and from Robert Moffat who passed along information about IDM,
89. Katherine Burton & Saijel Kishan "Raj Rajaratnam Became Billionaire De·
manding Edge" Bloomberg. l.P, Oct. 19. 2009.
90. David Glovin. Kathenne Burton & David Scheer "Galloen's Rajaratnam
Charged m Biggest Hedge Scheme" Bloomberg. l.P: Oct. 16. 2009.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
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Sun Microsystems and AMD and AMD's venture in Abu Dhabi in
which ffiM participated. Chiesi then passed along these tips to Kurland and both traded on the news. Also, Chiesi passed these tips to
Rajaratnam, who in turn gave Chiesi inside information AMD and
other companies. According to a phone conversation between
Chiesi and Rajaratnam on July 24, 2008, Chiesi told Rajaratnam
that her source told her that Akamai's share price would go down
to US$25. That day, Akamai share price closed at US$32.18. As a
result, Chiesi told Rajaratnam to short Akamai's shares everyday
and hence Rajaratnam profited.94

3.

The Case of McKinsey

Anil Kumar was the director at McKinsey & Co., and he gave
Rajaratnam tips about McKinsey's client. Kumar was not only a director in McKinsey, but also an investor in Galleon. He became a
consultant for AMD as McKinsey's client. AMD was considering
spinning off its semiconductor operation into a joint venture with
the Abu Dhabi government. That would bring a major investment
from an Abu Dhabi wealth fund and likely increase in AMD stock
price. When both parties shook hands and sealed the deal, Kumar
called Rajaratnam on August 15, 2009 to tell him to buy the stock.
On that day and the following Monday, Galleon bought 5.9 million
shares of AMD at between the price of US$5.55-5.75.93
In turn, Rajaratnam relayed the information to Chiesi of New
Castle, which bad purchased 199,440 AMD shares at US$5.44. As
Chiesi worried about being caught, Rajaratnam suggested covering
her tracks by trading in and out of the stock while they wait for the
deal's completion. On the other hand, Galleon continued to add
AMD shares to its position and eventually reached 8 million shares
of AMD stocks. As the deal's announcement date was October 7,
Rajaratnam told Chiesi to sell half before the announcement. On
October 7, AMD shares rose 25% and increased the value of Galleon's shares by US$9.5 million. He sold 1.3 million shares on the
announcement day and held the rest and watched AMD shares dectine to US$3.5 by the end of the month under a f,;eneral decline of
the stock market amid the global financial crisis.
94. U.S. v. Oliesi, 09-mag-2307, U.S. District C<>urt, Southern Disb:ict of New York
(Manhattan).
95. John Helyar "Galleon Insider-Trading Case Opens Window on Secret Hedge
Funds" Bloomberg, L.P, Oct. 19, 2009.
96. Ibid.
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4.

Google

From a source of Market Street Partners, an investor relations
contractor for Google indicated that in July, 2007 that Google's second quarter earnings would be disappointing compared to market
expectations later in the month. The information was relayed to
Rajaratnam, who with a combination of buying Google put options
and short-selling on the stock, made a US$8 million profit.97

5.

The Investigation

Basically, this case is considered one of the most significant insider trading cases in the global financial world. The U.S. government's charging of Rajaratnam and five other defendants was due
to the help of wiretaps as it provided rich insider details of usually
secret hedge fund operations carried out by Rajaratnam and his related parties. The wire transcripts made it appear that trafficking in
inside information was a routine way of business for Rajaratnam.
The starting point was a 2005 job interview at Galleon which
Rajaratnam asked applicants to name companies where he has an
"edge" or access to inside information. The applicants had later become confidential witnesses for this case. Even though this informant was not hired by Galleon, the witness began feeding
Rajaratnam inside information. The information enabled Galleon
to turn a US$4 million profit on a tip about Blackstone Group's
US$20 billion buyout of Hilton the day before the announcement.
The informant in turn receives inside information from Rajaratnam
on Intel and other companies. This informant later pled guilty and
cooperated by taping conversations \vith Rajaratnam and
Rajaratnam's private talks with his friends. 96
One frequent caller was Danielle Chiesi, fund manager in New
Castle Partners and Bear Stearns veteran. A call in 2008 indicated,
Chiesi's colleague Mark Kurland had encouraged her to get more
inside intelligence from the relationships and not to worry about
the consequences. As a result, Chiesi had cultivated an executive in
Microchip to provide inside information and at Akamai Technologies, she had a family friend who leaked data to her. She used
Akamai intelligence for New Castle's trading and passed it to
Rajaratnam.99 As indicated in a previous section, she and
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.

INSIDER TRADING IN CHINA

45

Rajaratnam made a handsome profit by shorting the Akamai
shares.
Danielle Chiesi is an important part of Rajaratnam's insider
trading ring. According to the investigation, she is involved in the
insider trading scheme on AMD and Akamai, she received a lot of
insider information from hotel ballrooms and bars during the past
decade. As an analyst at New Castle Fund LLC, a New York hedge
fund that manages about US$1 billion. She was a regular at conferences on technology companies and had face time with executives
for information on their companies. She would wear short skirts
and low-cut tops and barhopped to get information from people on
the dance floor. A blond former teenage beauty queen, she used
her sexuality to build sources at the male dominated tech companies and she was very proud of her network. As a result, Chiesi got
tips from executives at technology companies and passed them to
hedge fund managers such as Rajaratnam. Her boss Mark Kurland
in New Castle, who was also being arrested, had encouraged her
source building. The reality is Chiesi's source building paid off. New
Castle made US$3.8 million in six months, starting in July 2008 by
using information gathered by her. 100 Please bear in mind that 2008
was the year of the global financial crisis and the equity market
suffered during this period of time, so her source building did make
her trade ahead of market during difficult market times.
C. Goffer - November 6, 2009
On November 6, 2009, there were additional charges on fourteen people for charges against the defendants include conspiracy
and fraud. This time it focused on the center of a new insider trading ring headed by Zvi Goffer, a former Galleon employee who
sought tips and Arthur Cutillo, an attorney at Ropes & Gray LLP
and the ring's key source of information. As Goffer later founded
his own company, Incremental Capital LLC, paid tipsters including
Cutillo for information on merger and acquisitions and giving them
pre-paid mobile phones so they would avoid surveillance. This new
insider ring included Craig Drimal, Galleon employee; Jason
Goldfard, New York-based attorney; Goffer's brother Emauel Goffer; Atheros Communications Vice President Ali Hariri, and Iocremental Capital employee David Plate; and Michael Kimelman.
Another person who pled guilty and cooperated with prosecutors
100. Anthony Effinger, Katherine Burton & Ian IGng "Woman Who Sank Galleon
Was Beauty-Queen-Turned-Analyst Insider" Bloomberg, I...P, November 22, 2009.
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was Steven Fortuna, managing director at hedge fund S2 Capital.
SEC also sued Schottenfeld Group, a New York-based broker
dealer where several defendants worked. 101
Within the ring, Goffer was known as "the Octopussy'', a reference to the 1983 James Bond film and indicates his reputation for
having multiple sources of insider information. For example, Goffer
gave one of his sources a disposable mobile phone before Bain
Capital LLC's proposed buyout of 3Com. The phone had two
programmed numbers labeled "you" and "me". After the deal was
announced, Goffer removed the phone's SIM card, bit it, and broke
the phone in half. I02
As part of this ring, Arthur Cutillo passed news about deals
Ropes & Gray was working on to Jason Goldfard, another New
York lawyer, who passed the information to Goffer. Even though
Cutillo no longer worked at the firm, he got kickbacks for his tips
on four deals including the purchase of Hilton Hotels Corp. Goffer
passed along the tips he got from Cuttillo to Kimelman, Shankar,
Plate, Drimal and his brother Emmanuel. Drimal and Shankar
leaked the information to others. I03
Wiretaps provided much of the evidence siniilar to the in the
Rajaratnam ring. As the investigator tapped Drimal's mobile
phone, Goffer's phone calls were intercepted at Galleon as soon as
he joined the company in January, 2008. 1(1.0
When Rajaratnam's Galleon and Chiesi's New Castle shorted
the Akamai in 2008 Fortuna's S2 Capital got the tips from them and
shorted along with them. From this trade, Galleon made US$3.5
million, New Castle made US$2.4 million and S2 made US$2.4 million. After the investigation, Fortuna pled guilty to security fraud
and is cooperated with the prosecutors.105
D. Gupta · March 2011

The prosecutor made public on their investigation on Rajat
Kumar Gupta on April 9, 2011. Rajat Kumar Gupta was not only a
board member of Goldman Sachs, but also served on Goldman
101. David Olovin, Bob Van Voris & Joshua Oallu "Hedge Fund Managers. Traders
Olarged in Galleon Trading Probe"' Bloomberg. L.P. November 6. 2009.
102. U.S. v. Golfer
103. Ibid.
104. David Glovin, Bob Van Voris & Joshua Gallu ""Hedge Fund Managers. Traders
Olarged in Galleon Trading Probe"" Bloomberg. L.P. November 6. 2009.
lOS. Anthony Effinger. Katherine Burton & lao King "Woman Who Sank Galleon
Was Beauty·Oueen·Turned·Ana1yst Insider·· Bloomberg, L.P. November 22. 2009.
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board's audit, compensation and corporate-governance committee.
He was the strategic and operational expert on its board. Before
joining Goldman, he was the worldwide managing director of McKinsey & Co and special adviser to Secretary General of United Nation. He also worked in AMR Group, Procter & Gamble, Harman
International Industries, Genpact Ltd and Russia's OAO Sberbank
after his days in McKinsey. He formed partnerships with
Rajaratnam to form Taj Capital Partners in 2006 and the fund
aimed to put US$2 billion into South Asian investments and half of
its investments through a hedge fund run by Rajaratnam. Even
though this involvement was short lived as Rajaratnam withdrew
from the deal, but this made the prosecutors investigating
Rajaratnam's interest on trading in Goldman stock in 2008, especially on the trade made before the September 2008 disclosure that
Berkshire Hathaway's Warren Buffett paid US$5 billion to acquire
Goldman's preferred stock paying 10% interest.106
Besides Rajaratnam, Gupta had a relationship with another
defendant in this case, Ani! Kumar. They were friends and associates from his days in McKinsey and Kumar had pleaded guilty on
January 8, 2010 for leaking insider information to Rajaratnam over
5 years and in exchange for US$1.75 million. During Gupta's days
in McKinsey, Kumar was the head of operations to outsource highlevel research to India.107
On the other hand, the insider trading prosecution of Gupta
was built on circumstantial evidence that may be less persuasive
than the wiretap evidence on Rajaratnam. As the prosecutor lacked
direct wiretaps on Gupta, they sought to convict Gupta based on
the timing of his phone caUs with Rajaratnam and Rajaratnam's
trades that immediately foUowed. Prosecutors unsealed a six-count
indictment accusing him of leaking inside information to
Rajaratnam. It began in March 2007 that Gupta tipped Rajaratnam
about Goldman Sachs's first quarter 2007 earnings as he and Gupta
participated in the Goldman Sachs board meeting as audit committee from Galleon's office. During the meeting, the audit committee
discussed the company's quarterly earnings as it would be announced to the market the foUowing day. This conference call had
made the prosecutor to add a new securities fraud charge where
tbere was discussion on the quarterly earnings release of Goldman
106. John Helyar, Mebul Srivastava & David Glovin "Goldman Sa<:bs Director
Gupta Dealt with Rajaratnam" Bloomberg, L.P, April Z2., 2010.
107. Ibid.
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Sachs that it would exceed analyst estimates. About 25 minutes after Gupta left the conference call; Rajaratnam's fund purchased
about 350,000 Goldman shares. Gupta continued to tip Rajaratnam
on its September 19, 2JXfl board meeting as its quarterly earnings
were announced. 108
Gupta was also accused of telling Rajaratnam about Berkshire
Hathaway's US$5 billion investment in Goldman Sachs in September 2008, Goldman's unexpected fourth quarter loss in 2008 and
P&G's poor performance in late 2008. To show Gupta tipped
Rajaratnam about Berkshire's investment, evidence shows Gupta
called Rajaratnam approximately 16 seconds after learning about it
during Goldman Sachs board meeting on September 23, 2008 and
Rajaratnam bought the shares minutes later. To establish that
Gupta leaked news about Goldman's 2008 loss, he called
Rajaratnam 23 seconds after leaving a board conference call on October 23, 2008 and Rajaratnam sold 150,000 Goldman shares the
next morning."» To prove that Gupta disclosed P&G's poor earnings performance, the indictment cites an eight minute telephone
call that Gupta made to Rajaratnam from Switzerland on January
29, 2009, hours after be learned about P&G's financial results.
Rajaratnam also claimed to have gotten information from someone
on the P&G board. 110
With the prosecution on Gupta, as the prosecutor lacked direct
wiretaps, the prosecutor used tools for traditional insider trading
cases by matching up phone calls and trades and the timing of the
meetings. In other words, they based on circumstantial evidences of
well-timed phone calls and trading based on material events. Another circumstantial evidence adopted by the indictment was Gupta
had invested US$2.4 million in at least two Galleon offshore funds
and put US$10 million into a venture with Rajaratnam called Voyager Capital Partners and committed US$22.5 million to a fund
they built that focused on emerging markets in Asia. 11 ' In other
words, a motive can be established from Gupta in providing tips for
Rajaratnam as his investment \vith Rajaratnam could help him
108. Patricia Hurtado ··Gupta Took 2007 Goldman Earnings Call at Galleon, U.S.
Says" Bloomgerg. L.P, Jan 31. 2012.
109. U.S. v. Gupta, 11-cr-00907, U.S. District Court for Southern District of New
York (Manhallan).
110. SEC v. Gupta. ll-cv~7566, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York (Manhallan)
Ill. David Glovin, David Voreacos & Patricia Hurtado .. Gupta Case Built on Cir·
cumstantial Proof May Help Defense" Bloomberg. LP, October 27. 2011.
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profit from the insider information he had access to from being the
board member of Goldman Sachs and P&G.
On June 2012, Gupta was found guilty on t.h ree counts of securities fraud and one count of conspiracy with a maximum of 20
years in prison and acquitted him or two counts of securities
fraud.'t 2 The prosecutor based their conviction on the argument
that Gupta had illegally provided a virtual open line into the board
room for his benefactor and business partner, Rajaratnam. The outcome of this case should be regarded as a victory for the office of
the Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI in their assault on insider
trading, which used tools normally employed against organized
crime, including phone taps and informants. Also, Gupta is the
most prominent of those convicted at trial or to plead guilty since
the nationwide crackdown on insider trading in October 2009. This
conviction has sent a message that no one is off the limits. 113
E.

lmpUc:ations from These Cases

Even though the above mentioned cases are all independent
cases, either the defendants had relationships or the insider trading
dealing activities they engaged in were inter-related in some way.
As a result, this can be illustrated as the complexity of insider trading cases. On the other hand, the prosecution of the above cases can
also serve as an indication that U.S. legal authority are now more
focused and stringent on insider trading activities especially am.id
the global financial crisis.
As a result, a few important implications emerged from the
Rajaratnam and Gupta cases that will serve as valuable insight for
future U.S. or China insider trading cases. They are as follows:

I.

/nsid~

information and

aggressiv~

research

The Rajaratnam's case focuses on a slice of trades that produced US$20 million in alleged profits and provides a snapshot of
network of informants and traders led by Rajaratnam. In this case,
his <XKOnspirators included a McKinsey & Co consultant, a Intel
Corp treasury manager and a Bear Stearns veteran. With the help
of his insider trading ring, Rajaratnam was able to build his hedge
fund to manage US$7 billion at its peak in 2008. Even after the
112. l'alrieia Hurtado. David Glovin and Bob Van Vons " In Gupta. Jur()!$ Saw the
American Dream and Convicted Anyway" Bloomberg. L.P. June 16. 2012.
tt3. l'arlicla Hurtado. David Glovin & John Hclyar "Rnjnt Gupta Convicted of ln• ider Trading by U.S. Jury" Bloomberg, L.P, June IS, 201 2.
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Internet bubble burst in 2000. Galleon's Diversified Fund climbed
43.7% in the three year period to 2002, while the S&P 500 dropped
37.3%. 114 Before the case was discovered, Rajaratnam was considered a genius in the market, but this case proved that his profit
making trades were helped by inside information. This is an issue
on the violation of a perfect market. Under assumption of perfect
market, every participant has equal access to information. As people like Rajaratnam exist, the market is no longer fair or perfect.
Basically, the profit advantage that Rajaratnam has was due to his
inside information. It is based on the disadvantage on the general
investment public. This will burt market confidence and will drastically decrease the markets competitiveness and have a detrimental
effect on investment confidence.
Another significant issue about the access of inside information
is the argument that it is not illegal but only considered aggressive
research. As every trader wants an edge on the stocks they trade,
but there are many grey areas when it comes to aggressive research.
The general guideline is when you trade on material, non-public
information that comes from a company insider who is breaching its
fiduciary duty, and then it is considered illegal and can no longer be
considered aggressive research. 115

2. Employees and price sensitive information
Another important implication that arises from this case is the
investigation on insider trading by Galleon Group and technology
executives such as Intel and iBM may prompt Silicon Valley companies to clamp down on how employees handle sensitive financial
information. These companies realize that they should make sure
their employees understand the rules of insider trading on what
they can and cannot talk about in regards to sensitive financial
information.11 6
As for the companies who have employees or ex-employees
involved in this as either being arrested or turned into witnesses
such as Polycom, AMD and Intel, they all revised and reinforced
their insider trading rules and policies with their employees. For
Polycom, their CEO sent e-mails to all employees reminding them
of the rules against divulging confidential insider information. They
114. Katherine Burton & S..oJ<l Kisban "Raj Rajaratnam Became Billionaire Demandoog Edge" Bloomberg. t..P. October 19, 2009.
liS. Ibid.
116. Kar<o Gullo. Brian Womack & Ari Lery. "Rajaraloam Otse Is "Wake-Up Call"
for Solocoo Valley Companoes" Bloomberg. t..P. October 20. 2009.
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also review their existing policy to see if there are further enhancements to be made. As for AMD, they consistently remind employees to manage confidential information properly. For Intel,
employees who deal with material information receive training on
at least an annual basis.117
As illustrated by these cases, many technology companies are
involved with inside information as they provide a target for people
to make use of insider information because their share price movements tend to be more volatile compared to other industries such as
food or utilities. This fact may push the technology companies to
ensure their staff and employees are familiar with policies about
how to handle financial information.

3.

Issues for the hedge fund on wiretaps

The uncovering of Bernard Madoffs US$65 billion Ponzi
scheme had increased the financial regulations for hedge funds, but
this case provided a new concern for the hedge fund as they realized they may get caught on tape as the government expands use of
wiretaps to ferret out insider trading. The Rajaratnam case is the
first time prosecutors used secretly recorded phone conversation
against hedge funds. 118
As Rajaratnam regularly talked to hundreds of contacts, including other hedge fund traders, his arrest rattled hedge fund managers who were questioning whether legitimate discussions caught
on tbe tapped line will draw scrutiny to their conversations. Also, a
broader fear concerned the hedge fund manager as whose phones
are being monitored as prosecutors and SEC continues their
probes, as the word wiretap struck fear in everyone even the innocent. The hedge fund executives instructed their colleagues to be
extra careful about what they say on the phone, not because they
are breaking the law, but because they are fearful that any conversation about stocks could be misconstrued. 1 ' 9
On the other hand, prosecutors argue that they turned to wiretaps because of the ease hedge funds can hide when trades were
based on illegal tips as it was always difficult to establish the existence of insider trading from the prosecutor's side. As illustrated in
this case, Rajaratnam bad instructed others to fabricate e-mail trials
117. Ibid.
118. Kfttherine Burton & David Olovin "Galleon Wlretnp.• Rattle Hedge Fund as
Insider 1 rod ina Targeted" Bloomberg. l.P, October 26,2009.
119. Ibid
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that would explain why they executed the illegal trade. 120 As a re·
suit, e-mails have become ineffective in investigating insider trad·
ing. That is the reason that prosecutor had turned to phone
wiretaps to nail down important hedge fund managers such as
Rajaratnam. T his is because phone wiretaps provide information
that is in real time and hard to manipulate by the defendant.
As wiretaps were adopted for the prosecution on Rajaratnam
and his trading ring, there is a concern that wiretaps would be re·
quired for future success in prosecuting insider trading cases. The
jury may expect wiretaps to be present as concrete evidence for es·
tablishing insider trading cases. On the other hand, the growing fear
in wiretaps will force the hedge fund industry to improve their trad·
ing mechanism in order to pass the threat on wiretaps. As indicated
by the Rajaratnam's case, trading from insider trading tips does allow a fund to make a handsome profit irregardless of the weak
global financial market. As a result, the profitable incentive for in·
sider trading does exists, so there will always be a huge temptation
for hedge funds managers to continue to work on their insider in·
formation edges to get ahead from their trading peers and avoid the
scrutiny of regulatory bodies such as the SEC.

Circumstantial ~vidence adopted for conviction
As for the case regarding Gupta, prosecutor adopted circumstantial evidence for his indictment. The risk for this traditional in·
sider cases investigation is Gupta's defense may offer alternative
explanations for the contacts and calls between Gupta and
Rajaratnam as they are both family friends and business partners.
From Gupta's defense, they claimed Gupta called Rajaratnam was
to obtain information about his investment in the Voyager Fund
managed by Rajaratnam. 121 From the prosecutor's perspective, they
bebeve Gupta provided the inside information to Rajaratnam because of his friendship and business relationship with Rajaratnam.
On the other hand, Gupta benefited from Rajaratnam capital commitment to and position as a limited partner of the US$22.5 million
private equity fund they had. 122
On the other hand, Gupta was still found guilty and convicted
based on circumstantial evidence as the jurors became convinced of
4.

120. /but
121. David Glovin, David Voreaeos & Pa1ricia Hunado "Gup1a c- Buill on Cireu~mtanual Proof May Help Dd<rt<e" Bloomberg. LP, Oclober 27. 2011.
t22. Palricia Hunado ·Gupla Tool 2007 Goldman Eamonp Call 11 Galleon. U.S.
Sa)> Bloomgerg. LP. Jan ~I. 2012.
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Gupta's guilt after they examined the late-in-the-day timing of
phone calls to Rajaratnam and the trades be made immediately afterwards. In other words, it was the information and actions take
was the focus. The phone call records showed that Gupta called
Rajaratnam just minutes before the end of trading and Galleon
fund managers purchased 217,200 shares of Goldman Sachs stock
just two minutes before the market closed. 123
As a result, the success of the conviction of Gupta based on
circumstantial evidence showed the U.S. financial regulator and legal authorities decided in widening the scope on eliminating insider
trading activities in the financial markeL This more stringent approach will make insider trading activities more difficult to bide
under the flag of coincidences, because coincidences will no longer
be regarded as an effective excuse in persuading jurors that insider
trading activities had not taken place.

5. Penalty should be triple to the gain
The federal judge ordered Rajaratnam to pay US$92.8 million
in the case brought by the SEC, this is because SEC argued that
Rajaratnam's penalty in lawsuit should be triple to more than
US$94 million, an amount based on his gains and losses avoid
through trades in 6ve stocks after receiving i.nside information. The
court ruling agreed with the SEC that Rajaratnam's crime deserved
triple civil damages. 12A This is because the SEC penalties were "designed to make such unlawful trading a money losing preposition,
not only just for this defendant, but for all who would consider it,
by showing if you get caught, you are going to pay severely in monetary terms". 125
In another words, the US regulators bad inclined towards severe penalties to discourage insider trading from taking place in the
first place. This is because regardless of using wiretaps or circumstantial evidence, insider trading is difficult and timely to catch in
the first place. If a penalty can serve as an effective tool to decrease
chances of insider trading taking place, this should be considered an
effective approach for limiting and decreasing the harm that insider
trading imposes on the general financial market.
123. Patricia Hurtado, David Olovin and Bob Van Voris "In Oupla. Juron Saw tbe
American Dream and Conviclcd Anyway• BloomberJ. L..P. June 16. 2012.
124. Patricia Hurtado "RaJinllnam Must Pay $92.8 rrullion on SEC Case. Jud&e
Rules" Bloombera. L..P. November 8. 2011.
125. SEC v. Rajantnam. Olk\--8811, U.S. District Court. Southern D.strict of New
York (Manhauaa).
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Hedge fund lawsui1 risk rises as insurance companies are
quoling coverage

Since the hedge fund risk of lawsuit is rising after regulatory
probes of insider trading at Galleon Group, insurers are quoting
rates that are 5 to lOo/o higher for coverage that protect hedge funds
against government investigations and investor lawsuits, after two
years of rate declines. A hedge fund with US$200 million in assets
under management seeking US$5 million of coverage could Eay
about US$75,000, up from less that US$70,000 six months ago. 26
This type of professional liability coverage pays a hedge fund's
legal expenses if employees are the subject of a regulatory probe or
legal action by government or investors. The policies are triggered
once allegations are made, and before fault has been determined.
On the other hand, insurers can deny or try to claw back claims
payments if policy terms are violated. In practice, most hedge funds
allocate the costs of coverage to investors. 127
In regards to this type of insurance policies, it is still the investors paying for the cost of the fund manager's wrong doing. Once
the policies are triggered by a regulatory probe or legal action by
government or investors, it is the hedge fund being paid by the insurer and it is investors who are actually paying for these policies.
As a result, this type of insurance policy is actually a way to protect
hedge fund managers in doing insider trading. Once they are investigated by the regulator, they can still get coverage from the insurer
at the expense of investors. As a result, this is an indication on how
Wall Street and financial professionals are able to use advance financial mechanisms to protect themselves against investigations
and investor claims. In other words, the government regulators
should also look into this type of insurance coverage to prevent
hedge fund managers from hedging away all their risks toward regulators and investors.
lX. CONCLUSION
In general, the issues for China's insider trading situation examined alone or compared with the U.S. could be concluded as
follows.
In recent years as insider trading cases have grown exponentially in China, Chinese regulators have recogni1-ed their need to
126. Noah Bubayar "Hedge Fund> LII"Wt Risk Rises Afl<r Galleon Probe" Bloom·

berc. L.P. March 14. 2012.
121. tbod.

INSIDER ThAoiNG IN CHiNA

55

improve their regulations in regulating the securities market and
restrict the occurrence of insider trading. As a result, they introduced several new measures and rules in recent years in regulating
the securities market. For example, they introduced Interim Provisions on the Securities Investment Advisor Business, Tentative Provisions for Issuance of Securities-related Research Reports and
Interim Provisions on the Release of Securities Research Reports
in 2010. In September 2011, they adopted Decision on Revising the
Relevant Provisions on Major Asset Reorganization and Supporting Financing for Listed Companies, Administrative Measures for
Material Assets Reorganization of Listed Companies, the Release
of Suggestions on Strengthening the Supervision of Listed Companies, the Administrative Measures for the Takeover of Listed Companies, Measures for the Administration of Disclosure of
Shareholder Equity Changes of Listed Companies, Administrative
Measures for Material Assets Reorganization of Listed Companies
and Regularizing the Information Disclosure of Listed Companies
and Behaviors of Relevant Parties. Also, in May 2012, they introduced Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Law in Handling the Criminal Cases of Insider Trading
and Divulgement of Insider Information. In other words, China has
tried very hard to improve their insider trading regulatory system.
On the other hand, as China's equity market is still a developing
market, China's regulatory system is also on an ongoing iniprovment process.
In the past, China has been criticized that their penalties are
too light in regards to crimes resulting from insider trading. As insider trading could lead to enormous profit gain, a light penalty
served to be ineffective in curbing insider trading. As a result,
China in recent years has also improved this aspect. They increased
their penalty against insider trading. For example, the case of
Qingdao Kingking and Guoyuan Securities, its two defendants are
Shiao Shih Ching and Wang Yi had both sentenced death parole
and Shiao with returning unlawful profit of RMB$72.5 million.
Even though a heavy penalty is not an effective mechanism in extinguishing insider trading from taking place, without it, it could
make insider trading take place without a fear factor.
A. Compare China with the United States

After examining the insider trading situation in China and U.S.
in recent years, we can see that the both economies are at different
stages of developing their insider trading regulatory mechanism.
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1. U.S. Perspective
Since the U.S. equity market is a very mature market with a
long history in addressing insider trading, for example its related
regulations were introduced as early as 1920s, its problem leading
to recent insider trading is a people issue. Despite its comprehensive regulatory mechanism, people's greed and desire for more than
normal profit has led to insider trading to occur in recent years.
Rajarnanrun and Gupta are both financial elites controlling both a
popular fund house (Galleon) and a major U.S. financial institution
(Goldman Sachs), but their positions did not binder them from engaging in insider trading. In other words, it's the human issue in
insider trading that will be the most difficult to address. This is also
the reason why U.S. regulators engaged in a method that usually
deals with drug dealers or criminals in investigating insider trading
in the cases above. This is because insider trading in a sense is as
harmful as a drug problem. Insider trading is the drug problem in
the financial market.
2. China's Perspective
In China's case, it is still at the stage of needing more comprehensive insider trading regulations in targeting its insider trading
dealing resulted from shell listing or amphibian officers. Once
China improves their insider trading regulatory framework, then
they will gradually have to address the human issue in insider trading just as the United States is today. They may also have to acknowledge insider trading is as harmful to its financial market as a
drug problem is to human beings. At that stage, they may also have
to broaden their evidence collection mechanism to insider trading
such as wiretaps or circumstantial evidence as is the case with the
Unites States in recent years.
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GLOSSARY
Selected Chinese Names and Te rms
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Company Law
Securities Law

Interim Provision
(Note: Interim Provisions issued by the relevant governmental
departments are just as good as law in China.)
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£nterim Provisions on the Securities
I nvestment Advisor B usiness

iiE:nli!l'i .llil flij ft !itr

Listing Rules

Jllt~..t. m~~w

Measures for the Administration of
Disclosure of Shareholder Equity
Changes of Listed Companies

J: Hi~ uj lilt* J;\'lllt~ Z;fJ
f;) .Q.!lUi'11 llll:IJ.i'!

Opin ions on the Application of
Securities and Futures Laws

tfl!h·~

;1;1~

*

t'i"l:X ~ ff ~Hrlllt~;n:..t.
rli1'fJ11!:/}~

Regularizing tbe Information
Disclosure of Listed Companies and
Behaviors of Relevant Parties

~-T1! iB l: rli ~ iiH~.!.
§UI.ffl~ X~ 1itr 1511¥.1

Tentative Provisions for Issuance of
Securities-related Research Reports

~ 111 it£ :1fli1f 1t ~ fi tr

The Administrative Measures for
the Takeover of Listed Companies

.t rli ~ ,;J qj(jlll;Jfi'll!l}l}i'!

am
~~

*

58

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STuDIES SERrES

The Decision on Revising the
Relevant Provisions on Major Asset
Reorganization and Supporting
Financing for Listed Companies
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The Interpretation on Several
Issues Concerning the Specific
Application of Law in Handling the
Criminal Cases of Insider Trading
and Divulgement of Insider
Information
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The Notification on the Regulation
on Major Purchase or Selling of
Large Assets buy Listed Companies
The Paper in relation to exam and
approval domestic enterprise issuing
stock in overseas market
The Release of Suggestions on
Strengthening the Supervision of
Listed Companies
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Beijing Higher People's Court
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Henan Province People's High
Court
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People's Republic of China
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China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC)
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Development and Reform
Commission

£/il~i!X·~~t:

State Council Securities
Commission

m*~YE~~~~

The Ministry of Commerce of the
People's Republic of China
(MOFCOM)
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China International Trust and
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China Petrochemica.l Corporation
(Sinopec)
CmCGroup
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